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The Professional Prospectus: A Call for
Effective Professional Disclosure
Benjamin P. Edwards *
Abstract
Without easy access to relevant information, many consumers
unwittingly trust serious decisions to professionals with histories of
malpractice and negligence—leading to both individual and
societal harms. This Article proposes to improve professional
services markets with a tool that has already proven effective in the
securities markets: a prospectus. A “Professional Prospectus” would
reduce information asymmetries and improve the market for
professional services through disclosure and consumer choice.
A Professional Prospectus would alter the market for
professional services by making professional reputation a more
potent force. Economic theory often relies on “reputation effects” to
ensure the efficient functioning of the market without providing for
mechanisms to efficiently broadcast reputation. Tailored
disclosures delivered through a Professional Prospectus would put
existing public information into consumer hands, allowing the
market to more efficiently price professional services. This would
discipline and deter professional misconduct and reward
higher-quality service providers.
To showcase a feasible Professional Prospectus intervention,
this Article presents an initial use case demonstrating how a
mandatory disclosure intervention could improve the market for
immigration law services. The principles developed in this Article
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may also improve private and social outcomes in other markets for
professional services.
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I. Introduction
THERE ARE IDIOTS. Look around.
—Lawrence H. Summers, Former Secretary of the Treasury 1
No doubt the same may be said of all professions. They are all
conspiracies against the laity.
—George Bernard Shaw, Author 2

Like many others before him, Celso Lima Mejia learned the
hard way that a professional license does not guarantee basic
competence. 3 After Guatemalan rebels kidnapped Mr. Mejia
1. See Paul Krugman, How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Sept. 2, 2009 (“Lawrence Summers once began a paper on finance by
declaring: ‘THERE ARE IDIOTS. Look around.’”).
2. GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, THE DOCTOR’S DILEMMA, at xv (1906).
3. See Gary Rivlin, Dollars and Dreams: Immigrants as Prey, N.Y. TIMES,
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during the country’s civil war, he fled to the United States with his
family. 4 Mejia paid attorney Miguel Gadda thousands of dollars for
assistance with an asylum claim. 5 Although he had hoped for a
green card, Mr. Mejia received a deportation order instead. 6
Consumers often lack useful information about professionals
before they hire them. 7 When Mejia hired Gadda on a family
friend’s recommendation, 8 he probably did not know that the
California State Bar had previously suspended Gadda for
misconduct in 1990.9 When it removed Gadda from practice for the
second time, the California State Bar found that “at least six”
courts had reviewed Gadda’s work and declared that his clients
had received “ineffective assistance of counsel.”10 This is no small
finding. The ineffective assistance of counsel standard requires
that representation be “so poor that it affected the fundamental
rights of the client and the client’s right to due process.” 11
Current markets for professional services often function
poorly and fail to ensure competent services.12 Backward-looking
consumer protection through malpractice liability and public
discipline often fails to protect consumers because professionals
rarely internalize malpractice’s true cost. 13 The private
June 11, 2006, at BU1 [hereinafter Dollars and Dreams] (discussing unethical
attorneys who take advantage of immigrants).
4. See id. (same).
5. See id. (same).
6. See id. (same). Another lawyer later obtained relief for Mr. Mejia even
though Mr. Gadda had “made such a mess out of the asylum claim.” See id.
(quoting attorney Ilyce Shugall).
7. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 753
(“It may be impossible for clients to determine in advance which lawyers present
the highest risks.”).
8. See Dollars and Dreams, supra note 3 (discussing Mr. Mejia’s case).
9. See In re Miguel Gadda, 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 416, 2002 WL
31012596, at *1 (Rev. Dep’t State Bar Ct. of Cal. 2002) (explaining that Mr. Gadda
was “previously disciplined . . . in 1990”).
10. Id. at *32.
11. Id.
12. See Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why
Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the
Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1272 (1995) (“Many commentators have observed
that the legal profession is not particularly effective at ensuring that lawyers
provide honest or competent representation.”).
13. See Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession’s Dirty Little
Secret, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1657, 1695 (1994) (observing that the goals in responding
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immigration bar serves as an example because it is notorious for
its “uneven quality.”14 One immigration judge explained that “all
too often the representation [in immigration court] is mediocre,”
and that “many attorneys are just not very interested in their work
and therefore bring little professional vigor or focus to it.” 15
Immigration courts may see more substandard practice because
ex-post liability feedback mechanisms rarely function. 16 Consider
the tremendous hurdles faced by Mr. Gadda’s deported clients.
Their deportations frustrate their abilities to bring malpractice
actions or file disciplinary complaints. 17
The public frequently faces a lemon problem when seeking to
hire a professional. 18 While Mr. Mejia encountered a lemon lawyer,
lemons also lurk in the markets for doctors, financial advisers,
accountants, and other professionals. 19 If customers struggle to
locate high-quality services, the best professionals cannot reap
rewards for providing premium quality—leading them to either
exit the market or offer lower-quality services. 20
to malpractice—“protecting the public, deterring future misconduct, and
rehabilitating offenders”—are admirable, but that the systems by which to
achieve them are “highly ineffective”). In any event, overall malpractice claims
continue to rise. See Melissa Mortazavi, A No-Fault Remedy for Legal
Malpractice?, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 471, 471 (2015) (“The last forty years have seen
a marked rise in legal malpractice lawsuits.”).
14. See Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the
Need for New Narratives in the U.S. Immigration System, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
207, 247 (2012) (“The uneven quality of the immigration bar has been long noted
as the level of skill and knowledge of immigration law varies significantly.”).
15. Noel Brennan, A View from the Immigration Bench, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
623, 626 (2009).
16. For a discussion of substandard practice in immigration courts, see infra
notes 221–239 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of immigration court problems, see infra Part II.
18. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970) [hereinafter Akerlof,
Lemons] (explaining that buyers possess imperfect information when purchasing
a car because they do not know whether the car “will be good or a lemon”).
19. See Professional Negligence Claims, PAUL & PERKINS PA,
http://paulandperkins.com/medical-malpractice-attorneys/professionalnegligence-claims/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (listing professionals against
whom malpractice claims may be filed) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
20. See Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should
Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1115–16
(2014) (“If consumers cannot distinguish between good and bad professional
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Occupational licensing systems claim to mitigate these
problems by requiring persons to meet minimum standards before
joining a profession. 21 The empirical evidence does not always
support this claim. 22 While some studies find a modest increase in
quality from occupational licensing structures, others find that
occupational licensing drives up costs for consumers while offering
no increase in the quality of services (and in some cases results in
lower-quality services). 23
Consumers also receive little protection on the other side of
the licensing barrier to entry. Self-regulating professions and
occupational licensing bodies often fail to protect consumers
because they tend to act like cartels—behaving more in the
interests of their members than of the public. 24 These bodies move
ponderously when responding to complaints and allow problems to
linger in lax enforcement cultures. 25
Much of the problem stems from information asymmetry
between professional service providers and the public. 26
service, the high-quality, high-price providers will not be able to attract even
those customers who both want and can pay for better quality service.”).
21. See Morris M. Kleiner, Occupational Licensing, 14 J. ECON. PERSPS. 189,
191 (2000) (describing occupational licensing as a “process where entry into an
occupation requires the permission of the government, and the state requires
some demonstration of a minimum degree of competency”).
22. See CAROLYN COX & SUSAN FOSTER, BUREAU OF ECONS. FED. TRADE
COMM’N, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION 21–27, 40
(1990), http://www.ramblemuse.com/articles/cox_foster.pdf (“The empirical
findings indicate that mandatory entry requirements of licensing cannot
necessarily be relied upon to raise the quality of service.”).
23. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 20, at 1116–17 (collecting research on
professional licensing).
24. See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming A Fifth
Branch, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11 (2013) (“Self-regulation is easily justified if it
protects investors and maximizes social welfare but may not be if it is used merely
to transfer wealth from investors to brokers. This ‘cartelization’ problem is
present in almost every area of broker-dealer regulation.”).
25. See Benjamin P. Edwards, The Dark Side of Self-Regulation, 85 U. CINN.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 39) (“While traditional regulatory
agencies may also be prone to inaction, self-regulatory bodies may be particularly
lethargic protectors . . . .”); see also Robert W. Gordon, Portrait of A Profession in
Paralysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1427, 1431 (2002) (“In most states [the bar] does not
finance or staff more than a tiny fraction of the administrative machinery that
would be needed to handle client complaints effectively or more pro-actively
investigate systemic abuses and engage in rulemaking.”).
26. Cf. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 753 (“It is hard for clients to shop for the
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Professionals know whether they carry insurance, have had
disciplinary complaints or sanctions, and whether they have been
sued for malpractice. While a sophisticated patient or client might
uncover some of this information through due diligence processes,
most people may not even know where to begin.27
This problem has been solved before.28 Under the federal
securities laws, public companies must disclose information to the
public at regular intervals.29 This disclosure reduces the
information asymmetry between investors and management,
giving the more efficient securities markets an opportunity to
fairly price securities. In the primary market, it also gives
investors enough credible information to make decisions about
whether to buy securities directly from the issuer.
A similar type of intervention could dramatically improve the
market for professional services and help solve the professional
lemon problem—leading to increased demand for professional
services. 30 A “Professional Prospectus” regime—a disclosure
system that pushed short, salient, and relevant information to
consumers—would enable the market for professional services to
function more efficiently. For the regime to function, it would
require carefully designed, concise, and useful information to reach
consumers. 31 If a Professional Prospectus regime succeeded
completely, it could allow market forces to separate the mediocre
most skilled and trustworthy lawyer because as non-experts they may not be able
to accurately judge the quality of the lawyer’s services even long after they are
rendered.”).
27. See id. (discussing the “asymmetry of information between lawyers and
clients”).
28. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for A
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 722 (1984) (“[B]ecause
information has many characteristics of a public good, securities research tends
to be underprovided . . . . A mandatory disclosure system can . . . improve the
allocative efficiency of the capital market—and this improvement in turn implies
a more productive economy.”).
29. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., HILLARY A. SALE & M. TODD HENDERSON,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 7 (13th ed. 2015) (“In short, for
the securities market to function efficiently, much more disclosure is required
than in most other markets.”).
30. Cf. Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing Legal Education, 45 CONN. L.
REV. 1281, 1284 (2013) (“The untapped market for legal services is potentially
worth billions of dollars.”).
31. See infra Part II (discussing the design of a disclosure system).
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from the masterful—allowing more competent professionals to
reap appropriate rewards. At the least, it would bring market
forces to bear and drive the most deficient out. A well-functioning
disclosure regime would also give professionals real incentives to
improve the services they provide. By increasing confidence in
individual service providers, it would also likely expand markets
for professional services. 32
Some members of the learned professions will surely object to
a standardized disclosure structure’s inherent commodification
and airing of unflattering facts. A Professional Prospectus regime
will make many current stakeholders uncomfortable. It will
require real, dirt-dropping dossiers to make it into consumer
hands. Professionals will be forced into countless awkward
conversations to address consumer concerns. Because
self-regulatory organizations and licensing bodies seemingly value
protecting their members more than the public, they may balk at
broadly liberating and disseminating information about
professionals. 33
Mandatory disclosure systems can mitigate market failures
driven by information asymmetry.34 Securities regulation focused
on creating efficient securities markets provides a rough model for
a Professional Prospectus system.35 A well-functioning system for
the professional services markets, however, would look different
than the disclosure regime for the public securities markets. It
would focus on delivering small amounts of material information
and not bury consumers in papers. 36
32. See Knake, supra note 30, at 1284 (discussing limitations on the legal
market).
33. See Linda Morton, Finding the Suitable Lawyer: Why Consumers Can’t
Always Get What They Want and What the Legal Profession Should Do About It,
25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 287 (1992) (“Unfortunately, a marked disparity exists
between the type of information consumers want and the type the legal profession
thinks they should have.”).
34. See Coffee, supra note 28, at 722 (discussing the effect of mandatory
disclosure systems on economic markets).
35. Cf. Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of
Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 714 (2006) (“The main thesis of this
Article posits that the role of securities regulation is to create and promote a
competitive market for information traders.”).
36. For example, it would make little sense to require all professionals to
undergo annual audits. The high cost of producing that information would swamp
the benefits. Besides, most consumers will not wade through voluminous piles of
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A Professional Prospectus regime would embody a few key
characteristics. 37 Instead of expecting uninformed members of the
public to know how to perform rudimentary due diligence, it would
push essential information, much of which is already available to
those who already know where to look, out to consumers. 38 To
reach consumers at a time when they may still be shopping around,
a Professional Prospectus should, whenever possible, be delivered
before any agreement to perform professional services can be
made.39 To increase the chance that the public reads and
understands the information, it should be concise and delivered
with relevant contextual information.40
This Article is the first to call for a prospectus-type system to
push information to consumers in the markets for professional
services. The problem has been considered from different angles.
Some have argued that lawyers should be allowed to advertise. 41
Others have critiqued the current occupational licensing
structure 42 and considered the economic rationales for lawyer
regulations. 43 This Article goes further and calls for a meaningful
disclosure system for professionals in different professional
services markets.
paper before hiring a professional. As discussed in Part II below, an effective
Professional Prospectus will need to be brief. Public investors will only rarely
crack open the voluminous prospectuses and annual reports released by public
companies. See Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities
Offerings, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 18 (noting that “most public investors are
unlikely to actually read and grasp the stylized prospectus”).
37. See infra Part II (fleshing out the characteristics of a Professional
Prospectus).
38. See infra Part II (same).
39. See infra Part II (same).
40. See infra Part II (same).
41. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed to
Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, 1087
(1983) (“The Article applies basic market and economic theory to the production
and consumption of legal services and demonstrates that lawyer advertising
offers important advantages to consumers of legal services.”).
42. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 20, at 1115–16 (noting the difficulty
consumers face in evaluating the quality of professional services).
43. See Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An
Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 431–32 (2001) (“For example, no one has comprehensively
addressed the underlying justifications for the regulations we have, and whether
the regulations are satisfying those justifications.”).
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews the failed
markets for professional services and considers the weaknesses in
current occupational licensing structures and the limited role
reputation currently plays in the markets for professional
services. 44 Part II fleshes out the Professional Prospectus concept
and describes key considerations for crafting useful disclosures. 45
To illustrate how a Professional Prospectus system might
immediately improve markets, Part II also proposes implementing
a Professional Prospectus system immediately for attorneys
practicing in federal immigration courts. 46 Part III discusses
possible objections and the outcomes likely to flow from an
improved disclosure regime. 47
While this Article proposes near-term implementation for
attorneys practicing in immigration court, the concept has broader
applicability. The principles developed in this Article can be
applied beyond the markets for doctors, lawyers, and financial
advisers to help mitigate information asymmetry problems in
other markets.
II. The Failed Markets for Professional Services
Academics often contend that policymakers should hesitate to
intervene in otherwise well-functioning markets. 48 Market failures
occur when something about the terms of the interaction prevents
“market transactions from adequately serving the interests of all

44. Infra Part I.
45. Infra Part II.
46. Infra Part II.
47. Infra Part III.
48. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 745 (1999)
(describing the widely-accepted belief that among classical economists that
“[p]olicymakers should not attempt to regulate or otherwise ‘interfere’ with
markets absent some evidence of a market failure”); see also Thomas O. McGarity,
The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
1463, 1466 (1996) (“Although this ‘broken market’ paradigm may be useful
analytically for studying some kinds of regulation, it rarely explains why
Congress enacted protective statutes.”).
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concerned.” 49 Markets fail in different ways.50 In some instances,
markets impose costs on others—giving rise to negative
externalities. 51 Negative externalities also arise when shoddy
professional services generate costs for persons other than the
client, such as a lawyer that files substandard briefs and drives
judicial delays.
Information asymmetries also drive market failures. Ordinary
clients may struggle to adequately evaluate professional services 52
or to determine if they need professional assistance. 53 Almost by
definition, professional services markets have high degrees of
information asymmetry. Professionals often specialize in solving
information asymmetry problems because, in many instances, if a
49. See Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and
Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and
Uber?, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 293, 309 (2016) (discussing common market
failures).
50. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 585 (2003) (“In particular,
regulatory intervention may be appropriate where there is a market failure.
Welfare economics classically recognizes four basic sources of market failures:
(1) producer monopoly, (2) public goods, (3) information asymmetries, and
(4) externalities.”).
51. For example, industrial polluters may not bear the costs created by their
pollution. See Richard B. Stewart, Regulation in A Liberal State: The Role of
Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537, 1546 (1983) (“In the environmental
area, pollution and toxic waste spillovers became conspicuous examples of market
failures that led to calls for regulation.”). Their consumers may even prefer
pollution because it leads to lower costs. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note
24, at 9 (“Pollution may be profit maximizing for firms in the absence of regulation
because costs (such as damage to the air, vegetation, or water) are imposed on
others.”).
52. See Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans,
44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 551 (1994) (“The linchpin of the arguments
supporting the exclusive professional license is the claim that the lawyer-client
relationship is an asymmetric one: Clients cannot adequately evaluate the quality
of the service, and consequently they must trust those they consult.”). One
commentator defined the legal profession as “[a]n occupation whose members
have special privileges, such as exclusive licensing,” justified by several
assumptions, including that “clients cannot adequately evaluate the quality of
service.” AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Report of the Commission on
Professionalism to the Board of Governors and the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association, 112 F.R.D. 243, 261 (1986) (quoting Professor Eliot
Freidson of New York University).
53. See Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services,
73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 2 (2012) (“[M]any do not even realize when a lawyer might be
necessary or helpful.”).
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client had the information necessary to evaluate a professional
service, she would not need it. Consider financial advisers. If a
potential client understood modern portfolio theory, she would not
need a financial adviser’s assistance when allocating an
investment portfolio.
Information asymmetry concerns also justify professional
self-regulation. 54 If laypersons without professional expertise,
background, and public service commitments do not understand
the complexities of a professional practice, they cannot credibly
regulate the delivery of professional services. 55 This argument has
supported claims that the public must trust professionals to
regulate themselves.56
Professionals differ from most other market participants
because they often sell credence goods. 57 Without the ability to
evaluate a credence good’s quality, consumers must trust the
professionals that provide it. 58 Even after the service has been
performed, a consumer may lack any real ability to evaluate the
quality of the service provided. 59 For example, a patient
54. See Gordon, supra note 25, at 1431 (describing the theory that “[o]nly
professional peers have the necessary cognitive capacity and the appropriate
ethical orientation to client and public service”).
55. But see Gerald C. Sternberg, Regulating the Legal Profession Board of
Attorneys Professional Responsibility Annual Report Fiscal Year July 1, 1995 to
June 30, 1996, 69 WIS. LAW. 26 (1996) (“Public confidence in the attorney
grievance program has been enhanced by including non-attorney members on
these district panels and on the board.”).
56. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 25, at 1431 (discussing self-regulation in the
legal field). While the argument has a ring of truth to it, it only goes so far. Even
if consumers cannot make fine-grain distinctions between professionals, that does
not mean that they should be denied ready access to information with substantial
predictive value.
57. See Nathaniel G. Hilger, Why Don’t People Trust Experts?, 59 J.L. &
ECON. 293, 293 (2016) (“Doctors, lawyers, financial advisers, and auto mechanics
all suffer from an apparent conflict of interest: these experts first diagnose the
consumer’s condition, and then they treat the condition they have diagnosed. This
is known as the credence-good problem.”).
58. See Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm
Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1712–13 (1998) (“Clients cannot reduce agency
costs by shopping for lawyers who will faithfully serve their interests because
they cannot be sure that lawyers will keep their promise of loyalty. Legal services
are a kind of ‘credence’ good whose qualities non-expert clients must take on
trust.”).
59. See id. at 1713 (“Even discrete tasks such as drafting wills may be
credence goods because the quality may not be evident until long after the job is
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experiencing a post-surgical infection lacks any ability to
determine whether the infection arose because of substandard
medical care or because infections may follow even excellent
surgeries.
This dynamic also presents a classic agency cost problem
where unaccountable agents should be expected to take advantage
of their principals. 60 Economic theory assumes that both the client
and the professional seek to maximize their profits. 61 Principals
must incur costs to monitor agents to make sure the agent does not
take advantage of the relationship. Similarly, agents incur
bonding costs to assure their fidelity. Still, theory expects
additional opportunism will occur simply because it may be too
costly to prevent. 62 With consumers unable to assess professional
quality services before retaining a professional or to easily discover
the quality of the services performed afterward, the market
tolerates an astounding amount of this opportunism. 63
At present, today’s inefficient markets for professional
services pose extraordinary threats to individuals and to society at
large. 64 For every degree of inefficiency in these markets,
tremendous, widespread private and social costs accumulate.

done.”).
60. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Disaggregated Classes, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
305, 319 (2015) (describing agency cost problems in the class action context).
61. See Robert Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, 32
DEL. J. CORP. L. 393, 400–01 (2007) (“For economists, the issue is how to motivate
self-interested agents where information is asymmetric, behavioral and cognitive
limitations exist, and monitoring is not feasible. Economists concern themselves
with opportunism in all of its manifestations.”).
62. See Pearce, supra note 12, at 1232–33 (arguing that the taboo on
profit-seeking behavior by lawyers should be discarded in favor of seeking
business arrangements that promote the delivery of legal services and justice).
63. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the special
obligations of the legal profession).
64. See Ben Barton, A Comparison Between the American Markets for
Medical and Legal Services, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1331, 1333–34 (2016) (explaining
that American markets for legal and medical services often fail to serve large
swaths of the public—particularly the working poor).
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A. Private and Public Concerns
1. Private Concerns

On the private cost side, individuals face a range of dangers
from substandard to exploitative professional services. While some
of the costs driven by substandard professional advice may also be
thought of as public concerns, the direct client often bears most of
the cost in these instances.
a. Mortality Risk
Trusting a substandard professional may cost individuals
their lives. In the medical context, the risks may be particularly
acute and may be increasing. A recent study found that medical
error ranks as the third leading cause of death in the United States
with approximately 251,000 deaths attributable to medical error
annually.65 This study reports a higher number than prior studies
which had found somewhat lower figures. One 2004 study found
that 263,864 persons a year died because of medical error between
2000 and 2002.66 In 1999, an Institute of Medicine study reported
the lowest rate, finding that medical error caused between 44,000
and 98,000 U.S. deaths annually. 67
Medical professionals do not internalize most of the costs
generated by medical errors. 68 For every six instances of medical
65. See Medical error—the third leading cause of death in the US, BMJ (May
3, 2016), http://www.bmj.com/content/353/bmj.i2139 (last visited Sept. 21, 2017)
(discussing the study) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also
Arriana Eunjung Cha, Researchers: Medical Errors Now Third Leading Cause of
Death in United States, WASH. POST, May 3, 2016 (same).
66. HEALTH GRADES QUALITY STUDY: PATIENT SAFETY IN AMERICAN HOSPITALS
3
(2004),
http://www.providersedge.com/ehdocs/ehr_articles/
Patient_Safety_in_American_Hospitals-2004.pdf.
67. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH
SYSTEM 1 (1999), http://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/~/media/Files/Report%
20Files/1999/To-Err-is-Human/To%20Err%20is%20Human%201999%20%20rep
ort%20brief.pdf [hereinafter IOM, TO ERR IS HUMAN]. But see Rodney A. Hayward
& Timothy P. Hofer, Estimating Hospital Deaths Due to Medical Errors:
Preventability is in the Eye of the Reviewer, 286 JAMA 415, 419 n.10 (2001)
(arguing that the IOM figures are exaggerated).
68. See Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women,
Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1270 (2004) (“The rate of
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error, patients only file one malpractice claim against a medical
professional. 69 Even when a patient suffers significant damage,
“tort reform” statutes often limit the amount of recoverable
damages.70 The Institute of Medicine’s study found that medical
errors cost society between $17–29 billion annually. 71 At around
the same time, medical professionals only paid approximately $6.4
billion in medical malpractice insurance costs. 72
b. Diminished Health
Substandard medical care does not always lead to death.73 In
many instances, it may simply mean that a patient takes longer to
recover than she would have had she received a more appropriate
treatment or no treatment at all. 74 In others, a patient may live on
with a permanent condition or disability. One study found a
“fourfold difference” in complication rates between hospitals that
perform common hip and knee surgeries. 75 Given how many hip
preventable medical error far exceeds the number of malpractice claims.”).
69. See id. (collecting research finding that “[s]everal research studies have
estimated that for every six incidents of medical error, only one becomes a
malpractice claim”).
70. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West 2016) (“In no action shall the
amount of damages for noneconomic losses exceed two hundred fifty thousand
dollars ($250,000).”).
71. See IOM, TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 67, at 1 (reporting the estimated
societal impact of medical errors).
72. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, MEDICAL MISDIAGNOSIS: CHALLENGING THE
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS OF THE DOCTOR’S LOBBY 9 (2003) [hereinafter PUBLIC
CITIZEN, MEDICAL MISDIAGNOSIS] (comparing the amount spent on medical
malpractice insurance to the societal impact of medical errors).
73. See What Patients Need to Know About Medical Malpractice, MED.
MALPRACTICE CTR. (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.malpracticecenter.com/
news/10/15/15/what-patients-need-to-know-about-medical-malpractice
(last
visited Sept. 21, 2017) (“[N]on-fatal claims cases filed annually in the US amount
to billions of dollars in claims settlements or trial verdicts each year . . . .”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
74. See, e.g., D’Abbraccio v. New Rochelle Hosp. Med. Ctr., 654 N.Y.S.2d 383,
384 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (“The plaintiff presented expert medical opinion
evidence that the initial failure to diagnose her injury and properly treat it led to
an exacerbation of her injuries and a prolonged hospital stay.”).
75. Kevin J. Bozic et al., Variation in Hospital-Level Risk-Standardized
Complication Rates Following Elective Primary Total Hip and Knee Arthroplasty,
96 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 640, 646 (2014).
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and knee replacements occur each year,76 the different
complication rates reveal real risks that consumers might seek to
avoid. Even if the relatively higher rates may not be due to “error”
so much as the superior skill at other institutions, patients and
high-quality doctors would benefit from better dissemination of
this information.
Substandard professional services may also create ongoing,
significant stress that leads to other health consequences. 77 Even
non-medical professionals may impact their clients’ health in
significant ways. Losing a significant amount of money because of
a financial adviser’s fraud can drive a range of health problems. 78
One study found that more than a third of fraud victims became
depressed afterward and an even higher percentage reported
difficulty sleeping afterward.79 A significant body of research has
found that ongoing stress may drive negative health
consequences. 80

76. See generally Hilal Maradit Kremers et al., Prevalence of Total Hip and
Knee Replacement in the United States, 97 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 1386 (2015)
(counting the number of hip and knee replacements in the United States).
77. Cf. Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral
Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 449 (2005) (“Ongoing stress imposed by lengthy
divorce and child-custody proceedings, hostile corporate takeovers, or fear about
meeting year-end production quotas, for example, can contribute to serious,
life-threatening medical conditions.”); see also Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted
Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets
Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1141, 1173 (2001) (arguing that humans
evolved in an environment where “most severe but survivable stresses passed
more quickly than multi-district litigations, lengthy divorce proceedings, or
corporate takeovers”).
78. See Susan Antilla, How Bad Financial Advice Can Literally Make You
Sick, STREET (June 19, 2016, 2:20 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/
13607594/1/how-bad-financial-advice-can-literally-make-you-sick.html (last visited
Sept. 21, 2017) (“[T]he stress of a serious financial loss can trigger a whole new
wave of costs for clients.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
79. See APPLIED RESEARCH & CONSULTING LLC, NON-TRADITIONAL COSTS OF
FINANCIAL FRAUD 5 (2015) (reporting survey results).
80. See Elizabeth Agnvall, Stress! Don’t Let it Make You Sick: New research
reveals the links between stress and disease, AARP (Nov. 2014),
http://www.aarp.org/health/healthy-living/info-2014/stress-and-disease.html
(last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (collecting research on the negative health effects
caused by stress) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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c. Lost Profits & Increased Expenses
Even if professional services do not result in death or
diminished health, they often impose significant costs. Consider
the healthcare costs in McAllen, Texas—which recently ranked as
one of the “most expensive health-care markets in the country.” 81
One surgeon explained the problem as “‘overutilization . . . pure
and simple’” and that for doctors the practice had become about
“[h]ow much will you benefit?” 82 Doctors in McAllen gave patients
“two to three times as many pacemakers, implantable
defibrillators,
cardiac-bypass
operations,
carotid
endarterectomies, and coronary-artery stents” as in other
jurisdictions. 83 Although patients received invasive and high cost
procedures, they were “less likely to receive low-cost preventive
services, such as flu and pneumonia vaccines.” 84
Patients often have no reasonable means of assessing the
quality of medical advice or of an advice-giver. If a doctor tells a
patient that a heart surgery will significantly reduce the risks she
faces in the future, she may have no ready means of determining
whether the medical advice provided is good. On the other hand, if
she had ready access to information indicating that a doctor
recommends heart surgeries at triple the national rate, she might
pause. This information could make the investment in obtaining
additional opinions seem more reasonable.
But doctors are not the only professionals needlessly
generating expenses for patients. Low-quality, conflict-ridden
financial advice now causes many persons to pay excessive fees and
experience suboptimal retirements. In February of 2015, the White
House Council of Economic Advisers released a report on conflicted
investment advice, conservatively estimating that “the aggregate
annual cost of conflicted advice is about $17 billion each year” for

81. Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum: What a Texas Town Can Teach Us
About
Health
Care,
NEW
YORKER
(June
1,
2009),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/01/the-cost-conundrum
(last
visited Sept. 21, 2017) [hereinafter Gawande, Cost Conundrum] (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.

1474

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1457 (2017)

retirement savers.85 For the average retiree, low-quality advice
will result in running out of money five years sooner than if the
advice had been unbiased and in the client’s interest. 86
2. Public Concerns
In addition to significant individual harms, poor professional
advice also generates negative externalities and drives significant
social harms that affect more than the parties to the relationship. 87
Put differently, engaging a substandard professional may harm
more than the client—it may drive harms to society as well.
Improving professional services markets would reduce public
costs.
a. Substandard Professionals Generate Negative Externalities
Markets that sustain substandard professionals may drive
public costs. 88 Consider the social costs created by incompetent
attorneys. Judges and attorneys may spend excessive amounts of
time addressing frivolous or plainly meritless arguments,
generating crowded dockets, and slowing the delivery of justice
generally. 89
85. Jason Furman & Betsey Stevenson, The Effects of Conflicted Investment
Advice on Retirement Savings, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 23, 2015, 9:45 AM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/02/23/effects-conflicted-investme
nt-advice-retirement-savings (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) [hereinafter CEA,
CONFLICTED ADVICE] (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
86. See id. (noting the effects of conflicts of interest on advice).
87. See Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional
Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 705 (1977) (“[T]he costs of dispute resolution
and the impact of delay are rarely limited to the particular parties—the social
costs involved are borne by society as a whole.”).
88. See Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary on the Professionalism
Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259, 273 (1995) (“[S]ome of the costs of relative
incompetence are borne, not by the consumer, but by the rest of us, in the form of
delays, docket crowding, or additional judges.”).
89. See Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological
Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 163–64 (2000) (“[I]t is clear that many of the civil
justice system’s primary players and spectators are deeply concerned about the
persistence of frivolous suits, both because frivolous suits are ‘bad’ and because
the courts cannot adequately process nonfrivolous suits as long as frivolous suits
clog the system.”).

THE PROFESSIONAL PROSPECTUS

1475

Frivolous litigation launched by low-quality lawyers may
impose costs outside the legal system as well. 90 Consider the
choices faced by multinational business entities. When deciding
whether to build production facilities in a particular jurisdiction,
the business will consider additional uncertainty, cost, and risk
posed by the litigation environment. 91 If the jurisdiction carries an
excessive amount of litigation risk or inflated legal costs from
frivolous suits, the business will likely allocate its investment
elsewhere.
Still, quantifying the size of the purported frivolous litigation
problem may be difficult. Some evidence indicates that extended
medical malpractice litigation, at the least, rarely involves the
assertion of truly frivolous claims. 92 Plaintiffs may file some
actions simply to get access to the information needed to evaluate
the claim—in many instances plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss their
cases after reviewing information.93
b. Suppressed Demand for Professional Services
Integrity plays a vital economic role in facilitating
transactions. 94 It allows transaction partners to rely on each other
and complete value-increasing projects. Without integrity, many
otherwise socially useful transactions will not occur. 95
90. Cf. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court
and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 984 (2003) (“Critics
maintain that excessive and frivolous litigation . . . hinders America’s competitive
position in the global economy.”).
91. See John H. Beisner, Discovering A Better Way: The Need for Effective
Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 595 (2010) (“The uncertainty and cost
associated with frivolous lawsuits dissuade foreign companies from doing
business in America, depriving the U.S. economy of a much-needed source of jobs
and investment.”).
92. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, MEDICAL MISDIAGNOSIS, supra note 72, at 3
(reporting that plaintiffs only pursue one out of ten claims filed).
93. See id. (hypothesizing about why plaintiffs pursue a low rate of filed
claims).
94. See ANNA BERNASEK, THE ECONOMICS OF INTEGRITY 11 (2010) (describing
integrity as “the underpinning for all our commercial relationships”).
95. See id. at 11–12 (“For without integrity, the economy would not function.
There would be no trading, no credit, no buying or selling.”).
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A poorly functioning market for professional services may lead
to underproduction and underemployment of professionals. 96
Consider how a similar dynamic occurs in financial markets—if
investors distrust an issuer, they will discount the amount they
are willing to invest in a promising project to offset the risk that
they are being scammed.97 In a low-trust environment, investors
should be expected to invest less than they would in a higher-trust
environment. 98
The same dynamics affect other markets. A person will behave
differently when she suspects a professional may assert the need
for useless services. 99 Medical patients rationally fear that doctors
will prescribe unnecessary treatments. If a patient has a potential
medical issue, she might wait until she can be certain she needs
medical assistance before consulting with a doctor.
Public distrust of legal professionals may drive significant
underutilization of legal services. Many surveys and anecdotal
reports indicate that the public generally distrusts lawyers. 100
Recent studies have found that while 18% of respondents thought
lawyers had “high” or “very high” honesty or ethical standards,
37% believed that lawyers had “low” or “very low” honesty or
96. See Ribstein, supra note 58, at 1713 (“Clients’ difficulty in evaluating the
potential agency costs inherent in legal representation may reduce their
willingness to entrust work to lawyers and therefore lessen both lawyers’
revenues and clients’ potential gains from hiring lawyers.”).
97. See Ziven Scott Birdwell, The Key Elements for Developing a Securities
Market to Drive Economic Growth: A Roadmap for Emerging Markets, 39 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 535, 545 (2011) (arguing that abuses “eat away at capital
markets, destroy investor confidence, and increase the cost of capital”).
98. Cf. Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L.
REV. 928, 967 (2014) (“If investors come to see the securities markets as a rigged
game—one that seems by design to systematically disadvantage ordinary
investors—they could respond by discounting the amount that they are willing to
pay for all securities, thereby raising the cost of capital.”); see also Richard A.
Booth, Index Funds and Securities Fraud Litigation, 64 S.C. L. REV. 265, 272
(2012) (“[A]n increase in cost of capital may come from two sources: a market
perception of more risk inherent in the business of the subject company or harm
to the reputation of the subject company—a loss of trust.”).
99. See Gawande, Cost Conundrum, supra note 81 (describing how “heart
operations and catheter procedures and pacemakers were being performed in
McAllen at double the usual rate”).
100. See Andrew M. Perlman, Toward a Unified Theory of Professional
Regulation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 977, 1010–11 nn.206–07 (2003) (explaining that “the
public holds lawyers in particularly low esteem”).
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ethical standards. 101 In contrast, medical doctors received
substantially higher ratings, with 65% responding that medical
doctors were highly or very highly ethical.102
Despite the widespread distrust, the public strongly values
lawyer integrity. One study found that when consumers were
asked to rank eighteen different factors relevant to selecting a
lawyer, integrity rose to the top of the list—outranking experience
and cost. 103 Consumers may value integrity because it allows them
to trust their service provider to act in their interest in areas where
they cannot effectively monitor the attorney’s performance.
Concern with lawyer integrity likely impedes the engagement
of legal services. To be sure, substantial evidence indicates that the
current market frequently fails to match attorneys with unmet
service needs. 104 Economist and law professor Gillian Hadfield
calculated the unmet need for professional legal services as
“roughly $20 billion to ‘tens if not hundreds of billions of
dollars.’” 105
Improved tools allowing the public to better assess
professional service providers might also mitigate the lawyer
underemployment problem by making it easier for the public to
identify higher quality lawyers. As confidence increases that
attorneys will deliver valuable services, public demand for legal
services should also rise.
An expansion of legal services markets would benefit lawyers.
In 2011, only a little more than half of freshly-minted lawyers
found employment within nine months.106 While law schools have
101. See Honesty/Ethics in Professions, GALLUP (Dec. 11, 2016),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1654/honesty-ethics-professions.aspx (last visited
Sept. 21, 2017) (publishing survey results) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
102. See id. (same). Doctors may enjoy their higher ratings because they do
not work within an adversarial system.
103. See Robert E. Smith & Tiffany S. Meyer, Attorney Advertising: A
Consumer Perspective, 44 J. MARKETING 56, 60 (1980) (relating consumers’ top
considerations when selecting an attorney).
104. See Knake, supra note 30, at 1283–84 (discussing demand for legal
services compared with attorney employment).
105. Id. at 1287 (quoting Gillian Hadfield, Lawyers, Make Room for
Nonlawyers,
CNN
(Nov.
25,
2012,
12:25
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/23/opinion/hadfield-legal-profession/index.html
(last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)).
106. See Joe Palazzolo, Law Grads Face Brutal Job Market, WALL ST. J., June
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contracted and reduced production of new lawyers, many lawyers
remain underemployed. 107
c. Overspending on Other Categories of Professional Services
Interestingly, an inefficient market for professional services
may also drive overproduction. If consumers cannot identify
professionals that cause them to expend excessive sums on
professional services, the inefficient market structure may
sometimes also drive overutilization of professional services.
(1) Healthcare
Overproduction and cost problems appear particularly
pronounced in the health care context.108 In 2012, the United
States spent approximately $2.6 trillion on health care.109 By 2015,
the annual expenditure had grown to $3.1 trillion. 110 In a report
released in 2012, the Institute of Medicine found that about
one-third of overall spending may be unnecessary. 111 Worse,
25, 2012, at A1 (reporting on job prospects for law school graduates).
107. See Andrew Soergel, Hiring Outlook Bleak for New Law Grads, U.S.
NEWS AND WORLD REP. (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/
2016-08-18/hiring-outlook-bleak-for-new-law-grads (last visited Sept. 21, 2017)
(reporting on more recent employment data for recent law school graduates) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
108. Cf. Jessica L. Roberts & Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, What is (and isn’t)
Healthism?, 50 GA. L. REV. 833, 897 (2016) (“Health care is very expensive in the
United States . . . .”); see also David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do
Less: Financial Incentives to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155, 155 (1996)
(“With health care costs continuing to rise, it has become increasingly clear that
we cannot afford all medically beneficial care.”).
109. See Sarah Kliff, We Spend $750 Billion on Unnecessary Health Care. Two
Charts Explain Why, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2012), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2012/09/07/we-spend-750-billion-on-unneces
sary-health-care-two-charts-explain-why/?utm_term=.882e2e882940 (last visited
Sept. 21, 2017) (reporting on unnecessary healthcare spending) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
110. See Tami Luhby, Health Care Spending Expected to Grow Faster, CNN
MONEY (July 28, 2015, 7:36 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/28/news/
economy/health-care-spending/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (reporting on
healthcare spending levels) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
111. See Kliff, supra note 109 (reporting on unnecessary healthcare
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despite the high cost, the actual quality of health care in the
United States appears middling, at best.112
The compensation structure for many physicians may drive
some overutilization of health care services. 113 At present, many
medical professionals receive compensation tied to how many
procedures they perform. 114 When certain procedures pay more
than others, those procedures may become even more likely to be
performed. Combined, these incentives may drive significant
overutilization of health services.
Adding to the difficulty, the market for health services
generally fails to provide consumers with information before they
commit to purchasing decisions. 115 Consumers generally lack
spending).
112. See Isaac D. Buck, Caring Too Much: Misapplying the False Claims Act
to Target Overtreatment, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 463, 470 (2013) (“Nevertheless, not only
are the federal health-care programs speeding toward bankruptcy, but the quality
of U.S. health care is mediocre, the headlines say.”); see also John B. Kirkwood,
Buyer Power and Healthcare Prices, 91 WASH. L. REV. 253, 254 (2016) (“Many
studies have found that the United States spends nearly twice as much per capita
on healthcare as other developed countries, while achieving inferior results on
such important public health measures as life expectancy and infant mortality.”);
Sarah Kliff, Sebelius: Repeal a Bad Deal for U.S., POLITICO (Mar. 31, 2011, 4:47
PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/52339.html (last visited Sept. 21,
2017) (“We pay 2 1/2 times what anybody else pays in the world, and our care
outcomes look like we’re in a developing country.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
113. See Barbara A. Noah & Neal R. Feigenson, Avoiding Overtreatment at
the End of Life: Physician-Patient Communication and Truly Informed Consent,
36 PACE L. REV. 736, 751 (2016)
All of these problems are made worse by the fact that the system of
reimbursement for health care in the United States often deforms the
goals of care by paying physicians who provide more treatments and
tests while failing to reimburse physicians for the more
time-consuming and emotionally onerous task of discussing with
patients the option of doing less.
Alan M. Garber & Jonathan Skinner, Is American Health Care Uniquely
Inefficient?, 22 J. ECON. PERSPS. 27, 28 (2008) (“The fundamental cause is a
combination of high prices for inputs, poorly restrained incentives for
overutilization, and a tendency to adopt expensive medical innovations rapidly,
even when evidence of effectiveness is weak or absent.”).
114. See Jennifer Brougham, Physician-Owned Distributorships, 30 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 369, 370 (2016) (“For decades, the U.S. health care
system predominantly used a fee-for-service model, in which physicians and
hospitals were compensated for each service performed and had full discretion
over treatment decisions, incentivizing overutilization and increased costs.”).
115. See William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws
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information about both cost and quality—forcing them to commit
to services with little information about a professional’s actual
skill. 116 This may mean that lower-quality medical professions and
institutions may drive high costs while delivering subpar results
for their patients without any significant market force pushing for
higher quality.
(2) Financial Intermediation
Overproduction problems also plague the market for financial
services—overall costs have remained puzzlingly high. One study
found that “the unit cost of intermediation is about as high today
as it was at the turn of the 20th century.”117 Bafflingly high costs
persist even though improvements in information technology
“should lower the physical transaction costs of buying, pooling and
holding financial assets.” 118
The high overall costs may be explained by examining the
incentives for financial professionals. Financial advisers, often
commission-compensated salespeople, face significant incentives
to steer customers toward higher priced and less useful
products. 119 Often, financial advisers steer clients toward investing
in higher-fee funds simply because those funds pay a portion of
and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1716 (1999) (“Moreover,
purchasers’ lack of information stands out as the biggest obstacle to competitive
care management.”).
116. See id. (“Information deficits in health care relate to each of the three
dimensions along which American health care is typically measured: cost, access
to services, and quality of care.”).
117. Thomas Philippon, Has the U.S. Finance Industry Become Less Efficient?
On the Theory and Measurement of Financial Intermediation 5 (NBER, Working
Paper No. 18077, 2014) [hereinafter Philippon, Less Efficient].
118. See id. at 25–26 (“A potential explanation is oligopolistic competition but
the link between market power and the unit cost of intermediation is not easy to
establish.”).
119. See Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers As Fiduciaries, 71 U. PITT. L. REV.
439, 449 (2010) (discussing the compensation incentives for stockbrokers to steer
clients toward higher-priced products); see also Benjamin P. Edwards, Fiduciary
Duty and Investment Advice: Will a Uniform Fiduciary Duty Make A Material
Difference?, 14 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 105, 121 (2014) (“Broker commissions vary by
financial product sold and not simply by the amount of the transaction. These
distorting incentives have long been recognized as creating material conflicts
between the Broker’s interests and the client’s interests.”).
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their fees to the financial adviser—not because they will generate
the best returns for the investor.120 In many instances, this means
that financial advisers steer clients toward purchasing
actively-managed funds even though low-cost, passively-managed
funds significantly outperform actively-managed funds. 121
Financial advisers even steer clients toward higher-cost
passively-managed funds—causing their clients to buy guaranteed
underperformance. 122 An index fund with fees of 1.25% will always
lose to an index fund tracking the same index with fees of 0.09%.
For asset management services, higher cost does not translate
into higher returns. It has been well-established for decades that
lower fees offer the best prediction of superior performance. 123 The
same notion has been encapsulated in “Brown’s Law of Brokerage
Product Compensation,” instructing that “[t]he higher the
commission or selling concession a broker is paid to sell a product,
the worse that product will be for his or her clients.” 124 Despite
this, about two-thirds of mutual fund assets now reside with
actively-managed funds. 125
Investors continue to work with financial advisers after
receiving bad advice—such as the advice to buy a high-fee
actively-managed mutual fund—for a variety of reasons. Many
120. See SECS. AND EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
COMPENSATION PRACTICES 7–8 (1995) (questioning whether a Broker rendered
“objective advice or simply maximiz[ed] commission income”).
121. See Jacob Hale Russell, The Separation of Intelligence and Control:
Retirement Savings and the Limits of Soft Paternalism, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L.
REV. 35, 59 n.102 (2015) (likening the debate over active versus passive investing
to the debate over climate change because the debate persists even though the
relative underperformance of active management has been conclusively
established for decades).
122. See Edwards, Dark Side, supra note 25, at 29 (describing high-fee index
funds).
123. See John C. Bogle, A New Order of Things: Bringing Mutuality to the
“Mutual” Fund, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1089, 1110 (2008) (collecting research).
124. JOSHUA M. BROWN, BACKSTAGE WALL STREET: AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO
KNOWING WHO TO TRUST, WHO TO RUN FROM, AND HOW TO MAXIMIZE YOUR
INVESTMENTS 217–18 (2012).
125. Anne Tergesen & Jason Zweig, The Dying Business of Picking Stocks,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2016, 12:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-dyingbusiness-of-picking-stocks-1476714749 (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (explaining
that although investors now move significantly toward passive strategies, “66%
of mutual-fund and exchange-traded-fund assets are still actively invested”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Americans lack even rudimentary financial literacy.126 This means
that they often never realize that they received bad advice. Adding
to the difficulty, many persons use financial advisers for assistance
during periods of their lives where they suffer significant cognitive
declines—further inhibiting their ability to effectively monitor a
financial adviser’s exploitative advice. 127
Much like how frivolous litigation increases costs within the
judicial system, overproduction of financial intermediation may
drive significant harm to the economy by creating a bloated
financial intermediation sector. 128 Research indicates that the size
of a nation’s financial intermediation sector roughly correlates
with its growth rates—a nation with too little financial
intermediation struggles to pair investor resources with business
opportunities, while an overly large financial sector also slows
growth by causing assets to recirculate within the financial
system.129

126. See OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUC. & ADVOCACY, SECS. AND EXCH. COMM’N,
STAFF STUDY REGARDING FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG INVESTORS viii (2012)
(explaining that “many investors do not understand other key financial concepts,
such as diversification or the differences between stocks and bonds”).
127. See ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, 2012 ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE FACTS AND FIGURES,
REPORT, at 14 (2012) (explaining that 13% of persons over sixty-five, and 45% of
persons over eighty-five, suffer from dementia).
128. Cf. Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 575
(2015) (“[R]ecent studies suggest that the relationship between the size of a
country’s financial sector and the rate of its development is an inverted ‘U’—
having a robust financial system is critical for economic growth, but too much
finance impedes development.”); see, e.g., Siong Hook Law & Nirvikar Singh, Does
Too Much Finance Harm Economic Growth?, 41 J. BANKING & FIN. 36 (2014)
(noting that in the relationship between finance and economic growth, more
finance is only beneficial to a certain point); see also Jean-Louis Arcand, Enrico
Berkes & Ugo Panizza, Too Much Finance?, at 3 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working
Paper No. 12/161, 2012) (observing “the standard result that, at intermediate
levels of financial depth, there is a positive relationship between the size of the
financial system and economic growth, but it also shows that, at high levels of
financial depth, more finance is associated with less growth”); Stephen G.
Cecchetti & Enisse Kharroubi, Reassessing the Impact of Finance on Growth 1
(Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Papers No. 381, 2012) (“[A]s is the case with
many things in life, with finance you can have too much of a good thing.”).
129. See RANA FOROOHAR, MAKERS AND TAKERS: THE RISE OF FINANCE AND THE
FALL OF AMERICAN BUSINESS 13 (2016) (“[S]tudies show that countries with large
and quickly growing financial systems tend to exhibit weaker productivity
growth.”).
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An overly large financial sector may also create drag on
economic growth through inefficient capital allocation. 130 This
happens because commission-compensated financial advisers now
steer capital with a preference for issuers offering larger
commissions to financial advisers. When issuers compete not only
based on the merits and the risks of their offerings, but also on how
effectively they bias capital-steering intermediaries, the likelihood
that the best opportunities secure funding diminishes. 131
Inefficient financial services may drive other, less obvious
costs. For example, conflicts of interest drive approximately $17
billion in annual fees from consumers. 132 This means that
retirement savers receiving conflicted advice may ultimately
receive 12% less in retirement and run out of retirement savings
years before they would have if they had received non-conflicted
advice. 133 This also imposes significant costs on an investor’s
extended family—meaning that subsequent generations may not
be able to take risks and found businesses if they need to hold on
to employment to fund medical expenses for aging parents. Social
support systems—such as Medicare—may even experience
increased utilization because of the drain on resources created by
conflicted financial advice. An overlarge financial sector may even
distort human capital flows—causing the most talented to go into
finance instead of pursuing careers in business.
B. Current Tools Function Poorly
It has been apparent for some time that the market failures in
professional services markets impose tremendous costs on
individuals and the public. Much of our current regulatory
infrastructure exists to improve these markets and to protect the
public from the worst possible abuses. This subpart considers why
current markets and the occupational-licensing model often fail to
protect the public.
130. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.
J. 181, 184 (2017) (examining the economic effects of financial regulations).
131. See id. (same).
132. See CEA, CONFLICTED ADVICE, supra note 85 (examining the effects of
conflicting advice).
133. See id. (same).
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1. Reputation’s Current Limited Force

Reputation only plays a limited role in the current markets for
professional services. To be sure, reputational pressures may
increase when professionals practice together in significant
groups. If professionals operate under the same brand, bad acts
from one member of the group may create a stigma attributable to
all group members. This shared reputation may create an
incentive to self-police and to protect the brand because a
reputation for quality allows members of a professional firm to
charge higher prices. 134
Judging a professional by her associations may be a
reasonable strategy. In the financial context, researchers found
that when troubled financial advisers cluster in a firm, their
colleagues tend to absorb the cultural norms. 135 One study found
that financial advisers with unblemished records were more likely
to have misconduct in the future if they associated with financial
advisers that had misconduct markers on their records. 136
Remarking on similar findings, two economists recently theorized
that a heightened concentration of brokers with misconduct
disclosures might provide information about “compliance culture”
at a particular firm. 137
The limited incentive for professional firms to police their own
ranks will not protect most consumers because many professionals
134. See Ribstein, supra note 7, at 754 (“Clients are willing to pay extra to
buy legal services from a big firm because they know that a cheating firm incurs
a penalty in the form of a diminished reputation and a lower price for its
services.”).
135. See Stephen G. Dimmock, William C. Gerken & Nathaniel P. Graham, Is
Fraud Contagious? Co-Worker Influence on Misconduct by Financial Advisors 4
(Apr. 7, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (“Controlling for merger-firm fixed
effects, and using changes to a financial advisor’s peers due to a merger, we show
that an advisor is 37% more likely to commit misconduct if his [new] co-workers
have a history of misconduct.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
136. See id. (noting also an asymmetry in this effect, such that while learning
bad behavior from peers is easy, unlearning it from peers is not).
137. See Hammad Qureshi & Jonathan S. Sokobin, Do Investors Have
Valuable Information About Brokers? 19 (FINRA, Working Paper Aug. 20, 2015)
(“[Harm Associated with Colleagues] has a statistically significant positive
coefficient . . . . Overall, these results show that including information about
[Harm Associated with Colleagues] on BrokerCheck would increase the
predictability of investor harm.”).
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do not practice within large firms. In the legal services market,
most attorneys practice either alone or in relatively small firms. 138
Medium to large law firms with more than fifty lawyers account
for only twenty percent of the legal services market. 139 Given the
market’s general fragmentation, firm reputation may only rarely
play a role.
For market forces to function effectively, reputation must play
a significant role. Yet reputation only plays a weak role in the
current markets for professional services because public
consumers both struggle to recognize and broadcast information
about low quality professionals. Two things must happen for
reputation to function effectively: (i) a consumer must recognize
that they received substandard services; and (ii) the consumer
must somehow broadcast that discovery to other consumers. 140
a. Discovery Problems
Consumers often struggle to recognize low-quality
professional services because professionals sell credence goods. 141
The surgical context provides a vivid illustration. The consumer
may not even be conscious while the professional performs the
service—effectively removing the consumer’s ability to monitor
performance directly.
Still, some interventions might increase the likelihood of
discovery. For example, information about average fees and
outcomes might put consumers on alert. Even though three
percent might seem a small percentage, most mutual funds charge
significantly lower ongoing fees. Simply giving consumers this

138. See LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 1 (2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/l
awyer-demographics-tables-2016.authcheckdam.pdf (noting that 49% of
attorneys practiced on their own and another 14% practiced in firms with between
two and five attorneys).
139. See id. (same).
140. See Kathryn Judge, Fee Effects, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1517, 1550 (2013)
(describing the two reputation feedback channels in general terms).
141. See Ribstein, supra note 58, at 1712–13 (“Even discrete tasks such as
drafting wills may be credence goods because the quality may not be evident until
long after the job is done.”).
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information may cause them to more critically consider services
falling outside the norm.
b. Broadcast Problems
Because professional misconduct may only be discovered in
rare instances, the broadcast channel remains the critical avenue
for reputational pressure. Despite this, our current systems fail to
broadcast information about professionals effectively. Even when
reliable data identifies higher quality professionals, the public fails
to receive the information. 142 For example, Pennsylvania collected
and analyzed information on heart surgeries and other
treatments.143 Despite public availability, few patients knew about
the information or took it into account when making decisions. 144
Without ready access to more useful information, most persons
simply rely on the recommendations of their friends and
relatives. 145
Simply getting the information out may be a challenge.
Ordinary consumers now face a significant incentive problem. If a
consumer discovers substandard professional services, she will
likely gain little by broadcasting that information publicly. In
contrast, she may receive some compensation if she agrees to keep
quiet about substandard service.
Amplifying
the
broadcast
problems,
professional
organizations now seemingly facilitate the suppression of useful
142. For example, the State of Pennsylvania has spent millions of dollars to
gather relatively sophisticated evidence on outcomes from cardiac interventions,
including cardiac surgery. See Eric C. Schneider & Arnold M. Epstein, Use of
Public Performance Reports: A Survey of Patients Undergoing Cardiac Surgery,
279 JAMA 1638, 1638 (1998) (explaining that a publicly available study was not
frequently used by the public).
143. See Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical
Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1597
(2002) (describing Pennsylvania program and explaining that patients “still seem
to pick their hospitals and physicians as a matter of individual recommendation
or convenience” and not based on data).
144. See id. (“[A] recent study found that very few cardiac surgery patients in
Pennsylvania are aware of or use this information in any significant fashion.”).
145. See, e.g., Elise C. Becher & Mark R. Chassin, Improving the Quality of
Health Care: Who Will Lead?, 20 HEALTH AFF. 164, 170 (2001) (stating that “the
large majority [of patients] rely on [recommendations of] friends and family” when
choosing doctors or hospitals).
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information. For example, the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA) manages the Central Registration Depository
(CRD), which centralizes information about stockbrokers. 146
FINRA and the North American Securities Administrators
Association (NASAA) partnered to create the database because of
their belief that it is “critical that information about these
individuals and firms be readily accessible to the investing
public.” 147 To make the information accessible, FINRA provides a
“BrokerCheck” website that allows the public to access information
contained in the CRD database.148
Unfortunately, the BrokerCheck website does not disclose
information in a form that allows investors to assess risk
effectively. 149 One review of the BrokerCheck website found that
“BrokerCheck data in its current form is virtually useless to
investors trying to protect themselves from bad brokers.” 150
146. Order Approving A Proposed Rule Change Amending the Codes of
Arbitration Procedure to Establish Procedures for Arbitrators to Follow When
Considering Requests for Expungement Relief, Exchange Act Release No. 34–
58886, 94 SEC Docket 1445, at 2 (Oct. 30, 2008) (“FINRA operates the Central
Registration Depository (“CRD”) pursuant to policies developed jointly with the
North American Securities Administrators Association.” (citation omitted)).
147. CRD & IARD, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, http://www.nasaa.org/industryresources/investment-advisers/crd-iard/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
148. BrokerCheck
by
FINRA,
FIN.
INDUS.
REG.
AUTH.,
https://brokercheck.finra.org/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
149. See HUGH D. BERKSON & MARNIE C. LAMBERT, BROKERCHECK—THE
INEQUALITY OF INVESTOR ACCESS TO INFORMATION REMAINS UNABATED—AN
UPDATE TO PIABA’S MARCH 2014 REPORT 24 (Oct. 19, 2016),
https://piaba.org/system/files/pdfs/Broker%20Check%20Update%20(October%20
20,%202016).pdf (“[I]t has become increasingly apparent that the data contained
in the national CRD system, and thus BrokerCheck reports, is incomplete,
unreliable or even false.”); see also Mark Schoeff, FINRA Targets Firms Hiring
Brokers With Checkered Pasts, INVESTMENTNEWS (Jan. 6, 2017, 1:05 PM),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20170106/FREE/170109956/finra-targetsfirms-hiring-brokers-with-checkered-pasts (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (“Finra has
recognized that these brokers pose a risk, but its BrokerCheck disclosures and
data do not adequately warn the public about the actual risk created by brokers
with regulatory disclosures . . . .” (quoting Ben Edwards)) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
150. CRAIG MCCANN, CHUAN QIN & MIKE YAN, HOW WIDESPREAD AND
PREDICTABLE
IS
STOCK
BROKER
MISCONDUCT?
3
(2016),
http://www.slcg.com/pdf/workingpapers/McCann%20Qin%20and%20Yan%20on
%20BrokerCheck.pdf.

1488

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1457 (2017)

FINRA’s website only allows the public to access tiny slivers of
information at a time and makes it available without useful
context.151
Making diligence less effective, FINRA’s BrokerCheck website
only presents a limited subset of the information available within
the CRD database.152 A Wall Street Journal investigation found
that “38,400 brokers have regulatory or financial red flags that
appear only on state records” that do not appear on
BrokerCheck. 153 The investigation found that 19,000 brokers with
complaints on their regulatory records appeared as though they
had clean records on BrokerCheck. 154
The information suppression extends beyond BrokerCheck
and to the CRD database itself. FINRA oversees a process through
which brokers frequently expunge information from the CRD
database.155 Although FINRA characterizes expungement as an
“extraordinary” remedy,156 one study found that in 2013,
arbitrators granted motions to expunge complaints 93.66% of the

151. See id. at 28 (“Investors querying BrokerCheck only see information on
one broker at a time and so do not know whether a broker’s reported
characteristics are unusual . . . .”).
152. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Exam Scores and Failures Belong on
BrokerCheck,
INVESTMENTNEWS
(June
1,
2014,
12:01
AM),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20140601/REG/140539987/exam-scoresand-failures-belong-on-brokercheck (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (“A fierce
struggle continues . . . over whether . . . BrokerCheck website should give
investors a full view or a sanitized and less salient version of a broker’s
background.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
153. Jean Eaglesham & Rob Barry, Wall Street’s Watchdog Doesn’t Disclose
All Regulatory Red Flags: Finra Doesn’t Make Public All Its Information About
Brokers, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 26, 2014, 9:47 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/wallstreets-watchdog-doesnt-disclose-all-regulatory-red-flags-1419645494
(last
visited Sept. 21, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
154. See id. (reporting the investigation’s findings).
155. See Christine Lazaro, Has Expungement Broken Brokercheck?, 14 J. BUS.
& SEC. L. 125, 131–32 (2014) (“[A] broker may also seek to expunge customer
dispute information from the CRD system through court or the arbitration
process.”(citation omitted)).
156. See Notice to Arbitrators and Parties on Expanded Expungement
Guidance,
FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/noticearbitrators-and-parties-expanded-expungement-guidance (last updated Sept.
2017) (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (“Expungement is an extraordinary remedy that
should be recommended only under appropriate circumstances.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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time when a party requested expungement after settling a
complaint. 157
These expungements make it possible for troubled brokers to
cause significant harm to consumers. For example, one broker,
Carl Martellaro, operated his own broker-dealer firm. 158 After two
investors filed arbitrations seeking to recover for $1.75 million in
losses, Mr. Martellaro settled the cases—with the condition that
the investors not oppose Mr. Martellaro’s request to expunge the
record of the action. 159 The investors’ attorney, Scott Bernstein,
explained that although his clients “cut a deal, . . . the public got
cut out.”160 With information about the prior action suppressed,
Mr. Martellaro went on to bilk investors out of $125 million in
another Ponzi scheme.161
2. The Flawed Occupational Licensing Model
Self-regulating professions often defend occupational licensing
by arguing that it protects the public from abuse and exploitation
when market forces fail. 162 Under this line of thinking, the public
cannot protect itself or regulate the profession because only
appropriately qualified members of the profession have the
capacity to understand or regulate it. 163 More skeptical voices raise
157. See Seth E. Lipner, The Expungement of Customer Complaint CRD
Information Following the Settlement of A FINRA Arbitration, 19 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 57, 92 (2013) (“[T]he expungement rate was 93.66%.”).
158. Michael Freedman, The X-ed Out Files, FORBES (Dec. 25, 2000, 12:00
AM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2000/1225/6616280a.html (last visited Sept.
21, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
159. See id. (“The awards stipulated that all references to the arbitration be
expunged.”).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Licensing laws make it illegal to engage in a form of work without the
appropriate governmental or quasi-governmental authorization. See Paul J.
Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 209, 210–11 (2016) (“Licensing laws make it unlawful, and sometimes
illegal, to practice in a particular field without first receiving the government’s
approval.”).
163. See Gordon, supra note 25, at 1430 (“The theory behind self-regulation is
that the quality of professional services, requiring as they do complex technical
knowledge and discretionary judgment, cannot be reliably evaluated by clients or
by lay auditors or regulators.”).
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concerns about whether the current structures for professional
self-regulation truly serve the public’s interests. In many
instances, occupational licensing devolves into economic
protectionism and fails to deliver promised public protections. In
many instances, self-regulation may offer mixed benefits and
burdens. Carefully crafted disclosure regimes may mitigate the
dark sides of self-regulation.
a. Cartelization Risks
Professional self-regulation creates an inherent and
ever-present risk of cartelization. 164 This occurs when a profession
acts more in its own interest than in the interest of the public. 165
Law, medicine, and finance may all be prone to cartel-like
behaviors. 166
Consider the ways attorney self-regulation exhibits a tendency
toward
self-interested
over
public-minded
behavior. 167
Professional barriers to entry apply before anyone may provide
even a limited amount of legal services. To obtain a law license a
person must complete a college degree, a law degree, and pass a
multi-day bar examination.168 While this may increase the
likelihood of competent practice, this also insulates the practicing
bar from competition.
Many bar association rules seem more designed to restrain
competition between lawyers than to protect the public. 169 For
example, Alabama requires attorneys to include the following
disclaimer when advertising: “No representation is made that the
quality of the legal services to be performed is greater than the
164. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 20, at 1107 (“But while some professions
may require restrictions to ensure quality and public safety, a close examination
of restrictions in those professions suggests that those boards, too, have abused
their ability to self-regulate.”).
165. Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 24.
166. Edlin & Haw, supra note 20, at 1107.
167. See Jonathan Macey, Occupation Code 541110: Lawyers,
Self-Regulation, and the Idea of a Profession, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1079, 1096
(2005) (“Legal self-regulation displays the typical self-interested behavior of a
cartel without any of the concomitant benefits . . . .”).
168. Id.
169. Edlin & Haw, supra note 20, at 1108–09.
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quality of legal services performed by other lawyers.”170 These
restrictions make it difficult for lawyers to differentiate
themselves.
b. Limited Review of Ongoing Competence
Professional regulatory bodies may man the gates, but they
often avert their gaze from activities beyond licensing’s wall. After
lawyers pass through a state’s bar exam and character and fitness
requirements, they rarely face any further competency review. In
many instances, state bars do not allocate substantial resources to
their enforcement staff to investigate complaints. 171
Similarly, many financial advisers operate with limited
regulatory oversight. For example, registered investment advisers
(RIA) 172 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act)
rarely face ongoing reviews of their practices. 173 Although the SEC
remains responsible for RIA examinations, its limited resources
allow it to review an RIA’s operations about once every eleven
years.174
Failing to adequately oversee RIAs may generate substantial
risk. While the SEC’s examinations of RIA practices have declined,
the assets managed by RIAs have swelled—as of 2012, RIAs
managed $38.3 trillion in assets.175 Despite the infrequent
examinations, misconduct rates may be rising—the SEC has

170. ALA. R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT 7.2(e).
171. See Gordon, supra note 25, at 1431 (“[T]he bar has spectacularly failed
to do its job. In most states it does not finance or staff more than a tiny fraction
of the administrative machinery that would be needed to handle client complaints
effectively . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
172. The statute defines a registered investment adviser as “any person who,
for compensation, engages in the business of advising others . . . as to the value
of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling
securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities.” 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)
(2012).
173. DIV. OF INV. MGMT. OF THE U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON
ENHANCING INVESTMENT ADVISER EXAMINATIONS 14 (2011).
174. See id. (explaining that with the SEC’s limited resources, “the average
registered adviser could expect to be examined less than once every 11 years”).
175. Id. at 9.
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begun to bring more and more enforcement actions against
RIAs. 176
These failures show that licensing bodies often fail to monitor
professional practice in any meaningful way. They may respond to
complaints, but they will only rarely proactively seek to identify
incompetent or substandard professionals. A Professional
Prospectus regime would amplify market forces and supplement
self-regulatory enforcement.
III. A Professional Prospectus
Disclosure-based solutions often improve market functioning
by reducing transaction costs for market participants. Still,
disclosures must be carefully designed, appropriately tailored and
delivered to aid consumer choice. 177 While the appropriate
disclosure regime will vary depending on the professional services
market, some essential attributes may increase the likelihood that
the information will be used effectively.
A well-crafted disclosure system would supplement
professional self-regulation by allowing market forces to vigorously
police professional ranks. More informed selection decisions could
shift demand away from the less competent—giving them an
economic incentive to improve their client or patient outcomes.

176. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Challenge of Fiduciary Regulation: The
Investment Advisers Act After Seventy-Five Years, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM.
L. 405, 433 (2016) (“SEC enforcement actions against advisers became even more
widespread.”).
177. Cf. Susanna Kim Ripken, Predictions, Projections, and Precautions:
Conveying Cautionary Warnings in Corporate Forward-Looking Statements, 2005
U. ILL. L. REV. 929, 977 (“[T]he focus should be on how to communicate forwardlooking information and future risks to unsophisticated investors in a meaningful
way, perhaps some of the previous insights gleaned from the psychological
research regarding the effective design of warnings in the consumer products
market may be helpful.”).
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A. Key Considerations for a Professional Prospectus Regime
1. Moving from Posting to Pushing
For a Professional Prospectus system to alter market function,
consumers will need to receive the information before they make a
firm commitment to a professional. 178 Achieving this requires
advancing beyond posting public information in accessible
locations to pushing the information to consumers.
a. Today’s Posting
At present, many professional organizations do significant
good by posting information about their members to their websites.
In the legal profession, state bars allow the public to retrieve
information about individual attorneys through the state bar’s
website. For example, the Florida Bar makes basic information
about attorneys available.179 It tells the public that a person should
“[m]ake a careful search for [a] lawyer; it’s an important
decision.” 180 The Florida Bar’s guidance also explains how a
consumer can check a lawyer’s disciplinary history—presumably
because the disciplinary history provides a meaningful signal to
the public. 181
State bars may improve consumer decisions by publishing
information about attorney discipline because previously
disciplined attorneys may be more likely to have future
misconduct. 182 While lawyer recidivism has not been extensively
studied, the available evidence indicates that lawyers with public
178. Cf. Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private
Ordering of Public Elections, 126 YALE L.J. 262 (2016) (pointing out that voters
need information on corporate political spending before an election to take it into
account).
179. How To Find A Lawyer in Florida Pamphlet, FLORIDA BAR,
https://www.floridabar.org/public/consumer/pamphlet018/ (last visited Sept. 21,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 2 (2007) (“It is no secret that some lawyers who have been
sanctioned continue to engage in misconduct . . . .”).
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discipline appear more likely to have future discipline than other
lawyers. 183
Financial regulators also post information about financial
advisers on the theory that the public should take the information
into account. 184 For example, FINRA explains that the public
should use its BrokerCheck website because it helps consumers
“make informed choices about brokers and brokerage firms and
provides easy access to investment adviser information.”185
In the financial advice context, evidence indicates that
advisers with past complaints pose greater threats to the public
than advisers without past complaints. In one recent study,
economists found that a financial adviser with past misconduct
was “five times as likely to engage in new misconduct as the
average financial adviser.” 186 Given the heightened risks posed by
brokers with misconduct histories, publicly posting this
information does significant good.
b. The Power of Pushing
Professional licensing bodies have accepted the premise that
consumers should use information about professional service
providers to make decisions. In public guidance materials, they
explain that consumers should consider disclosed information
when selecting a professional service provider. 187 Presumably,
professional regulatory bodies would not go to the trouble of
collecting and posting information if they did not believe that
consumers could benefit from the information.

183. See id. (same).
184. While the current disclosure system for financial advisers has significant
flaws as discussed above, it does make some information available to the public.
185. BrokerCheck by FINRA, FINRA, https://brokercheck.finra.org/ (last
visited Sept. 21, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
186. Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos & Amit Seru, The Market for Financial
Adviser
Misconduct
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2739170 (last visited Sept.
21, 2017) [hereinafter Egan, Matvos & Seru] (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
187. See, e.g., supra note 179 and accompanying text (encouraging consumers
to carefully evaluate their prospective attorneys).
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Unfortunately, many consumers lack awareness of these
resources or do not think to consult them when selecting a
professional. 188 Professional bodies have even created advertising
campaigns to increase awareness. Speaking about one campaign,
former FINRA Chairman Richard Ketchum explained that
“[p]eople immediately go online to check out a new restaurant
where they might spend $25 for a meal, but don’t think to use
BrokerCheck
when
they’re
handing
over
$2,500—or
$25,000 . . . . That has to change.”189
Pushing information to consumers may improve market
functioning by amplifying the broadcast channel created by
posting information. 190 Instead of assuming that consumers know
enough to perform their own rudimentary due diligence, a
Professional Prospectus regime would require professional service
providers to deliver partial disclosures on first contact and at
regular intervals. Ensuring that consumers receive information
increases the likelihood that they will be able to take it into
account.
A well-designed Professional Prospectus regime would put
useful information into consumer hands. Whenever possible
clients should receive disclosures about a professional before
beginning any engagement and at regular intervals for prolonged
engagements.191 Ideally, the public should be given an opportunity
188. For a discussion of underutilization of information resources in the
health context, see Mello & Brennan, supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text.
189. FINRA Launches National Ad Campaign Promoting Brokercheck,
FINRA (June 1, 2015), http://www.finra.org/newsroom/2015/finra-launchesnational-ad-campaign-promoting-brokercheck (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
190. In discussing the limited utility of posting information on BrokerCheck,
one consumer advocate argued that it would make more sense to simply “provide
the information . . . directly in the form of a plain English pre-engagement
disclosure document so that investors don’t have to go searching for such critically
important information.” Ted Knutson, Finra Kicking Off $3.5 Million
BrokerCheck Ad Campaign, FA MAG. (June 1, 2015), http://www.famag.com/news/finra-kicking-off--3-5-million-brokercheck-ad-campaign-21973.
html (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (quoting Barbara Roper) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
191. After the initial decision and an investment in a relationship, consumers
may be much less likely to change from this initial state. Cf. Jill Fraley, The
Meaning of Dispossession 12–13 (Wash. & Lee Pub. Legal Studies, Working Paper
No. 2017–1, Jan. 25, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2905798 (describing human unwillingness to change after an
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to read and review the disclosures before proceeding. This could be
accomplished by requiring that a professional first provide a copy
of the disclosures whenever a new client meets with the
professional.
Pushing should be preferred over posting for high-stakes
professional services because it puts useful information directly
into the consumer’s hands.192 The current “posting” model relies on
weak assumptions that consumers: (i) know that useful, public
information about professionals has been posted to a professional
self-regulatory website; and (ii) that they will remember to review
the information.
Adopting a preference for pushing over only posting
information will do significant good. While not every consumer will
closely review the information, enough will likely change behavior
to increase overall market efficiency. This will also increase
reputation’s force in shaping the professional services markets by
significantly amplifying the broadcast channel for relevant
information.
2. Short, Standardized, & Clear
Designing a Professional Prospectus regime requires informed
choices about how to present useful information. The most benefits
seem likely to emerge from presenting the information in a short,
standardized, and clear format.
a. Short
It would be a mistake to assume that if some immediate
disclosure does good, more would be better. 193 For some time, it has
been accepted that flooding consumers with tangentially relevant

investment) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
192. The costs associated with this proposal are discussed in Part III, infra.
193. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 419 (2003)
(explaining that “[s]tudies show that at some point, people become overloaded
with information and make worse decisions than if less information were made
available to them”).
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information does not improve decision-making. 194 Giving
consumers too much information may distract them with
irrelevant information and lead to poorer decisions. 195
An effective prospectus regime will strike an optimal balance
between volume and utilization. As documents grow longer, the
task of reading them both appears and grows more burdensome. If
research reveals that most consumers will not review more than a
single page disclosure, the disclosure distributed at the point of
contact should be limited to a single page.
Of course, the introduction of a Professional Prospectus
regime does not mean that professional bodies should post less
information on their websites. Information that cannot be included
in a Professional Prospectus should remain readily available. The
shorter disclosure would communicate key facts and notify the
recipient about the availability of additional information.
In some respects, the wisest structure may partially resemble
the disclosure structure used for mutual funds.196 A mutual fund’s
“summary prospectus” provides “information that the SEC views
as most important” including, among other things, information
about cost, investment strategies, risks, and information about
compensation paid to financial intermediaries. 197 The full
prospectus provides additional information.
b. Standardized
Standard disclosure requirements may improve market
functioning by increasing the ability of consumers to compare one
professional against another. Without a standardized disclosure
194. See Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure
Antidote: Toward A More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58
BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 146–47 (2006) (“[D]isclosure that is too long or complex to be
comprehensible to the average person floods the individual with too much
nonessential data and overloads the person with information that inhibits
optimal decision-making.”).
195. See id. at 160–61 (summarizing research).
196. See Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1968–69 (2010) (describing mutual fund prospectuses).
197. Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for
Registered Open-End Management Investment Companies, Securities Act
Release No. 8998, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,584, 74 Fed. Reg.
4546, 4552 (Jan. 26, 2009) (codified at scattered parts of 17 C.F.R).
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format, consumers struggle to use the information to compare one
professional to another. 198 Consider the comparison difficulties
created if health professionals were permitted to define
“complication” in different ways. One might only include shock and
hemorrhage while another might include a broader array of
complications. Different definitions would make it difficult for
consumers to understand actual differences in complication rates.
c. Clear
An effective Professional Prospectus regime will also convey
information clearly and plainly. Unlike securities disclosure,
which may be designed more for a professional audience, there
should be no doubt that a Professional Prospectus regime seeks to
deliver information directly to public consumers. 199 Given the need
to reach the public, disclosures should be written in clear and
simple language.
3. Benchmark Information
A Professional Prospectus should provide information as well
as any useful context that will allow consumers to evaluate the
information. Consider the difficulty of assessing the relative
danger posed by a broker with two customer complaints on her
record. Without context, a consumer may have no way to know
whether most brokers have two or more complaints.
Mutual fund disclosures suffer from a similar problem. 200
While a mutual fund prospectus provides fee disclosure, it does not
198. A similar dynamic exists in the securities markets. See STEPHEN J. CHOI
& A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & ANALYSIS 25 (4th ed. 2015)
(“Comparisons are more difficult if disclosures are not consistent.”).
199. See David Crump, Against Plain English: The Case for a Functional
Approach to Legal Document Preparation, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 713, 716 (2002) (“The
advisability of insisting on plain English depends upon the type of document at
issue. If the function of the document requires quick apprehension, plain English
is important.”).
200. See Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing Investment Management
Regulation, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 521, 546–47 (2009)
[W]hile settling on a uniform presentation of fee information is useful
because it facilitates comparison, the rules do not help investors with
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provide critical context. While a 2% fee might seem small for a
mutual fund, it falls on the pricier end of the scale. Many funds
charge substantially less for their asset management services. A
consumer reviewing a single prospectus lacks critical context that
may only come from benchmark information or from reviewing a
sizeable sample of prospectuses.
Still, selecting the relevant benchmark may be challenging.
Consider the difficulty of selecting a relevant benchmark for
criminal defense attorneys. Criminal defense lawyers tend to
receive substantially more complaints about their services than
other lawyers. Benchmarking their disclosures against statistics
for attorneys generally may mislead clients about their attorney.
To deal with the problem, a Professional Prospectus regime should
benchmark by relevant specialty whenever possible.
Without the context provided by benchmark information, a
Professional Prospectus may fail to alert many consumers of
situations where they should grow wary. The alert provided by a
benchmark may nudge consumers into more closely monitoring a
professional service provider.
4. Information with Predictive Value
While the precise disclosures should vary depending on
market, an effective Professional Prospectus regime will
prominently feature information with some predictive value.
Featuring information with known predictive value may aid
consumers and reduce the likelihood that they will base decisions
on irrelevant information.
Information that has predictive value in one context may not
have predictive value in others. For example, information about
customer complaints and past misconduct has proven to contain
predictive value for financial advisers. 201 Because complaint
information provides a meaningful signal about outcomes, it
the crucial next step—they never give investors an idea of how a fund’s
fees compare to other funds. Instead, investors are left to fend for
themselves in this regard.
201. See generally Egan, Matvos & Seru, supra note 186 (finding that
stockbrokers with misconduct histories are five times more likely to have future
complaints).
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should be featured in a Professional Prospectus for financial
advisers. Complaints may fall along a continuum for different
professions. For financial advisers, the mere filing of a complaint
seemingly provides statistically significant information about risk.
Similarly, a small percentage of physicians “account for a
disproportionate share of malpractice claims, settlements, and
judgments.”202 When complaint information provides a meaningful
signal about outcomes, it should be disclosed to consumers.
This does not mean that all complaint information about all
professionals should be featured on a Professional Prospectus.
Without evidence that complaint information provides a
meaningful signal, there may be no reason to believe that the
inclusion of the information would improve overall market
function.
Nonetheless, identifying predictive information may require
additional analysis and research. 203 In the market for attorney
services, research now indicates that information collected
through the legal profession’s character and fitness process
provides only marginal predictive value, at best.204 Practice setting
may offer some predictive value because bar authorities discipline
solo practitioners at higher rates than attorneys that practice
within larger firms. 205 Assembling effective disclosures may
require more research to identify factors that indicate poorer
outcomes.
Predictive information may be most readily accessible in the
medical context. 206 When medical professionals specialize and
202. See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care
Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the
Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 990 (2005) (citing statistical research).
203. Cf. David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and Efforts to Encourage
Healthy Choices by Individuals, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1637, 1658 (2014) (“Governments
need to do a better job at making sure their interventions reflect current scientific
understanding, and they need to ensure that more research is conducted to
improve our understanding.”).
204. See Leslie C. Levin et al., The Questionable Character of the Bar’s
Character and Fitness Inquiry, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 51, 52 (2015)
(“Surprisingly, however, it is unclear whether the data gathered during the
character inquiry actually predict lawyer misconduct.”).
205. See Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Law Firm
Practitioners, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 309, 312 (2004) (“Solo and small firm lawyers are
disciplined at a far greater rate than other lawyers.”).
206. See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in
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perform the same or similar procedures repeatedly, statistical
information about patient outcomes emerges. If a doctor lacks
experience in a procedure or has abnormally poor outcomes, a
patient may not actually give informed consent without receiving
information about the doctor’s lack of experience and outcomes.207
5. Insurance Information
Many states already require professionals to disclose
information about whether they carry malpractice insurance.
Giving consumers ready access to this information may improve
market functioning in key ways. If consumers shift toward
professionals with insurance, it increases the likelihood that they
will be able to recoup a portion of their losses if they receive
substandard services. If the disclosure regime causes more
professionals to obtain insurance, the insurance company’s rates
may force professionals to internalize malpractice risks.
B. An Immigration Use Case
Immigration court practice provides an initial use case to test
the efficacy of a Professional Prospectus regime. While
self-regulating professions may hesitate to impose disclosure
regimes on their members, a federal agency might more readily
move to impose disclosure requirements on persons practicing
within its administrative courts. Improving the legal services
market for immigration lawyers could unlock significant gains for
immigrant families, lawyers, and society.

Informed Consent: Comparing Physicians to Each Other, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3
(1999) (“With the advent of more extensive gathering and comparison of data, it
has become possible to provide information to patients not only about the risks
associated with the procedures for which consent was sought, but also about the
relative risks associated with the medical providers [performing] those
procedures.”).
207. See Johnson ex rel. Adler v. Kokemoor, 199 Wis. 2d 615, 644 (1996) (“Had
a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position been made aware that being
operated upon by the defendant significantly increased the risk one would have
faced in the hands of another surgeon . . . that person might well have elected to
forego surgery with the defendant.”).

1502

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1457 (2017)
1. The State of Representation

Representation significantly influences outcomes in
immigration courts. At present, the market for immigration
lawyers fails to deliver in terms of quantity and quality.208
a. Insufficient Representation Rates
In many instances, persons facing immigration removal
proceedings go forward without the assistance of a
representative. 209 While the figures vary from year to year, only a
limited portion of those in removal proceedings had the assistance
of an attorney. 210 Between 2007 and 2012, only 37% of persons in
removal proceedings had representation. 211
Representation strongly correlates with improved outcomes in
immigration court proceedings. 212 One recent nationwide study
found that respondents with representation were five and a half
times more likely to obtain relief than respondents without
representation. 213 This recent figure coheres with other analyses
that have found significant differences in outcomes for represented
versus unrepresented parties. In asylum cases, one study found
that “[r]epresented asylum seekers were granted asylum at a rate

208. See Robert A. Katzmann, Foreword, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 332 (2011)
(“The representation problem, nationally, is two-fold: (1) the fact that only forty
percent of noncitizens have representation nationwide; and (2) the substandard
quality of counsel in all too many cases, which all but dooms the immigrant’s
chances even in the cases of those who do have nominal representation.”).
209. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV., FY 2014
STATISTICS YEARBOOK F1 fig.10 (Mar. 2015), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/
attachments/2015/03/16/fy14syb.pdf.
210. Id.
211. Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel
in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2015).
212. See id. at 57 (“In short, at every stage in immigration court proceedings,
representation was associated with dramatically more successful case outcomes
for immigrant respondents.”).
213. See id. at 76 (“Our regression analysis, which controlled for numerous
case- and respondent-specific characteristics, reported this result most
dramatically: the odds were fifteen times greater that immigrants with
representation, as compared to those without, sought relief, and five-and-a-half
times greater that they obtained relief.”).
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of 45.6%, almost three times as high as the 16.3% grant rate for
those without legal counsel.” 214
Of course, factors other than representation quality may
account for some of the outcome differences between represented
and unrepresented respondents. 215 Perhaps only the most
motivated may seek representation, indicating a client’s will to
fight removal—a will that may be forged by fear of returning to a
country where she will face persecution. 216 Some differences in
outcomes may also reflect attorneys and nonprofits picking the
best cases and only representing persons with reasonable
probabilities of success. 217
Even if other factors partially account for the differences, the
different outcomes for represented and unrepresented respondents
show the need for counsel in immigration court removal
proceedings. 218 Despite this, federal law forbids appointing counsel
at the government’s expense. 219 In the current environment, a
right to appointed counsel for immigration matters does not
appear likely to emerge from court decisions or Congress soon. 220
b. Low Lawyer Quality
In addition to an overall shortage of representations,
immigration court representation also suffers from quality
problems. 221 One study of immigration practice in New York found
214. Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 340 (2007) [hereinafter Refugee Roulette].
215. See D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized
Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and
Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2188–96 (2012) (discussing selection
effects).
216. See id. (same).
217. See id. (same).
218. See Eagly & Shafer, supra note 211, at 3 (illustrating the scope of
underrepresentation in immigration court).
219. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(a) (2012) (“[T]he alien shall have the privilege of
being represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s
choosing who is authorized to practice in such proceedings . . . .”).
220. Cf. Anne R. Traum, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law on Its Own
Path, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 491, 547 (2011) (arguing that a Padilla-based rationale
for immigration counsel “does not appear imminent”).
221. See Elinor R. Jordan, What We Know and Need to Know About
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that immigration judges rated nearly half of immigration lawyers
as substandard, with 33% of practitioners rated as inadequate and
another 14% as grossly inadequate.222 These findings cohere with
other reports which have characterized many immigration counsel
as “barely adequate” at their jobs.223 A survey of judges found that
“immigration was the area in which the quality of representation
was lowest.”224
The quality of service provided by immigration lawyers varies
widely. The private immigration bar accounts for 91% of all
representation and provides significantly lower quality than other
representatives. 225 In contrast, nonprofits and law school clinics
generally provide higher quality representation. 226 In one study,
larger law firms providing pro bono services won an astounding
96% of their cases.227

Immigrant Access to Justice, 67 S.C. L. REV. 295, 299–300 (2016) (“Elsewhere,
scholars have similarly found that nearly half of removal-case representation is
inadequate.”).
222. See Symposium, Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of
Counsel in Removal Proceedings New York Immigrant Representation Study
Report: Part 1, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 364 (2011) [hereinafter Accessing Justice]
(“New York immigration judges rated nearly half of all legal representatives as
less than adequate in terms of overall performance; 33% were rated as inadequate
and an additional 14% were rated as grossly inadequate.”).
223. FELINDA MOTTINO, MOVING FORWARD: THE ROLE OF LEGAL COUNSEL IN
NEW YORK CITY IMMIGRATION COURTS 38 (2000), https://storage.googleapis.com/veraweb-assets/downloads/Publications/moving-forward-the-role-of-legal-counsel-in-newyork-city-immigration-courts/legacy_downloads/353.409747_MF.pdf; see also Robert
A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor,
21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3, 9 (2008) (“Often times, the reviewing appellate judge,
who is constrained at the time the case comes before her, is left with the feeling
that if only the immigrant had secured adequate representation at the outset, the
outcome might have been different.”).
224. Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality
of Legal Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 330 (2011).
225. See Accessing Justice, supra note 222, at 364 (“The epicenter of the
quality problem is in the private bar, which accounts for 91% of all representation
and, according to the immigration judges surveyed, is of significantly lower
quality than pro bono, nonprofit, and law school-clinic providers.”).
226. See id. (same).
227. See Refugee Roulette, supra note 214, at 341 (“[A]sylum applicants
represented pro bono by large law firms cooperating with Human Rights First
(formerly the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights) had a success rate of about
96% in the 479 cases they handled to conclusion in that same period.”).
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One recent, peer-reviewed study examined the differences in
outcomes for immigration clients represented by attorneys with
different track records before certain judges and found striking
differences in outcomes. 228 The study broke attorneys into three
categories by win rates: (i) poor attorneys in the bottom 10th
percentile with less than 4% win rates; (ii) average attorneys at the
50th percentile winning about 24% before a particular judge; and
(iii) good attorneys at the 90th percentile that won 60% or better
before a particular judge. 229 Startlingly, the study found that
“having no attorney is consistently more beneficial than having a
low quality attorney.”230 Average attorneys provide some benefit
and increase client odds to “about 9 percentage points better than
no attorney.”231 Representation quality makes a significant
difference with good attorneys performing on “average 32
percentage points better than an average one and about 40
percentage points better than no representation.” 232
2. The Lemon Problem Limits Market Solutions
The private immigration bar’s low quality drives a lemon
problem. A lemon problem can arise when sellers of goods or
services have more information than buyers. 233 If buyers cannot
tell whether they are purchasing a higher quality good or service,
they will only pay for an average-priced good or service. This
means that the producers of higher-quality goods or services will
not be compensated fairly. High-quality providers will either
reduce the quality of their offerings or compete in a different

228. See Banks Miller, Linda Camp Keith & Jennifer S. Holmes, Leveling the
Odds: The Effect of Quality Legal Representation in Cases of Asymmetrical
Capability, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 209, 210 (2015) [hereinafter Leveling the Odds]
(“[V]ariation in attorney capability is a primary driver of the disparity in asylum
outcomes in U.S. immigration courts.”).
229. Id. at 229.
230. Id. at 230.
231. Id. at 229.
232. Id.
233. See Akerloff, Lemons, supra note 18, at 489–90 and accompanying text
(noting the less-informed buyer’s disadvantage).
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market.234 A lemon problem can both degrade the average quality
of services and the amount of services available. 235
In the market for immigration lawyers, a significant
information asymmetry exists—the lowest quality immigration
lawyers know that they do not win their cases but their clients do
not. 236 In many instances, “immigrants are simply in a terrible
position to evaluate the claims made by lawyers and are often
naïve about what lawyers can and cannot do for them.” 237
Immigrants may also hesitate to express concerns because of
status differences between them and their attorneys.
This lemon problem may be especially pronounced in
immigration courts because ordinary reputational feedback
mechanisms may function with less force in immigration cases.
When a client loses a case because of low-quality lawyering, the
client does not remain in the community to spread word about the
attorney’s behavior. It may be particularly difficult to file
complaints and grievances after deportation.
Importantly, this lemon problem makes it more difficult to
keep higher quality lawyers in immigration court practice.
Consider the difficulty faced by a highly competent immigration
lawyer. If clients cannot tell the difference between good lawyering
and bad, they will not be more likely to hire the good lawyer. This
means that the good lawyer will face an ever-present incentive to
either shirk her responsibilities because hard work does little for
her career or to shift her practice to other areas. 238 As this cycle
repeats, the current, private immigration law bar develops and the

234. Id.
235. See id. at 495 (explaining that “dishonest dealings tend to drive honest
dealings out of the market” and that “[t]he cost of dishonesty, therefore, lies not
only in the amount by which the purchaser is cheated; the cost must also include
the loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of existence”).
236. The best available evidence indicates that persons in removal
proceedings struggle to identify higher quality lawyers. If the market could
effectively price immigration law services, it seems unlikely that respondents
would hire lawyers that reduced their chances below their expected outcome of
proceeding without representation. For further discussion, see Leveling the Odds,
supra note 228, at 229.
237. Id. at 213.
238. This, of course, assumes that the lawyer has some interest in making
money.
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overall size of the market diminishes because clients become less
willing to pay.239
This dynamic may also explain why law school clinics and pro
bono lawyers achieve relatively higher success rates. Their service
quality does not depend on the market’s ability to support their
practice.
3. A Professional Prospectus Intervention
There are different mechanisms for addressing information
asymmetry and lemon problems.240 For example, licensing has
been used to “reduce quality uncertainty” in the markets for
professional services. 241 Given the private immigration bar’s low
quality, it appears that the licensing model may either need to
impose a higher standard or embrace additional solutions. 242
Mandatory disclosure through a Professional Prospectus for
regular immigration court practitioners would improve market
functioning. 243 The disclosure enables immigration lawyers to
make more credible statements about their relative skill to
potential clients. 244 It also gives the least sophisticated consumers
of legal services a tool for assessing the relative competency of their
representatives. Ready access to this information would likely
make clients more sophisticated consumers of legal services.

239. Of course, respondents in removal proceedings face more barriers than
an unwillingness to pay for uncertain services. They may simply not have the
money. In many instances, the breakdown of trust in immigration attorneys may
undercut the ability of respondents to borrow funds from friends, families, and
financial intermediaries.
240. For a discussion on the different mechanisms, see Akerloff, Lemons,
supra note 18, at 499–500.
241. Id.
242. Cf. Shubha Ghosh, Decentering the Consuming Self: Personalized
Medicine, Science, and the Market for Lemons, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 299,
302 (2015) (“What should be emphasized is that there are several solutions to the
lemons problem.”).
243. It would be reasonable to implement a Professional Prospectus
requirement only for attorneys with a statistically significant sample of cases.
244. See Ghosh, supra note 242, at 302 (“[S]uppliers need to be able to make
credible statements about product quality so that consumers will be able to
identify the level of quality they seek for the product.”).
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Adding a Professional Prospectus requirement for
immigration court practice would be feasible. Immigration courts
already require attorneys to complete a form with each notice of
appearance.245 The Department of Justice can aggregate
information about attorneys regularly practicing in its courts and
generate Professional Prospectuses at lower cost than other
potential solutions. 246 Much of the information and relevant
statistical models for a Professional Prospectus may already be
available from academic research. 247
Certifying that an attorney provided the disclosures would not
be overly difficult. The Department of Justice could require an
attorney to certify that the client received the disclosure at the
outset of the representation when filing a notice of appearance, and
immigration court judges could verify that the client had received
it when accepting the representative’s appearance.
Significant social benefits should also emerge from improving
the market for immigration law services. It costs approximately
$158 per day to detain immigrants in removal proceedings. 248 If
improved representation makes it possible to detain fewer
immigrants or to detain them for shorter periods of time, the
change could result in significant social savings. 249

245. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NOTICE OF ENTRY OF APPEARANCE AS ATTORNEY
REPRESENTATIVE BEFORE THE IMMIGRATION COURT 1–2 (2015) (showing the
Agency’s “Form EOIR – 28”).
246. While a right to counsel in immigration court would do significant good,
a Professional Prospectus intervention requires less resources to implement and
may not require Congressional action because the Department of Justice has the
ability to regulate the conduct of attorneys practicing within its courts. Moreover,
testing the concept would not require nationwide implementation—the
Department of Justice could experiment with it in a few regions before
determining whether it offered benefits outweighing the costs.
247. See generally Leveling the Odds, supra note 228.
248. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION:
IMPROVED DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS NEEDED TO BETTER ASSESS PROGRAM
EFFECTIVENESS 18–19 (2014).
249. Immigrants would also benefit significantly from better advice. When a
substandard attorney creates false hope and files a meritless asylum claim, the
immigrant may lose months of their life to detention in order to pursue a doomed
asylum claim.
OR
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IV. Implications of a Professional Prospectus Regime
Moving toward a disclosure-incorporating regime for
professional services may alter the way market participants
behave. This Part discusses some of the objections to, and
implications of, a Professional Prospectus regime.
A. Potential Objections
1. Disclosure Costs
One objection to any mandatory disclosure regime is that
mandated disclosures impose costs on the persons required to
make the disclosures. A Professional Prospectus regime may
require professionals to gather, produce, and maintain records
about their practices. These burdensome requirements may
increase the cost of professional services because professionals will
be forced to charge higher prices to comply with these
requirements.
While any disclosure-based regime should keep a close eye on
the costs imposed, mandatory disclosure may reduce overall social
costs. If the disclosure requirements simply mandate that the
professional present otherwise public information, forcing
disclosure reduces public search costs and the need for many
different members of the public to perform costly and duplicative
research. Instead of having one person gather the information,
every client that conducts rudimentary due diligence will expend
time and effort to gather the information.
In most instances, a professional may also be the lowest-cost
producer of information about themselves.250 Unlike members of
the public with little information about what information may be
available, professionals already know the types of information
available. Unlike professionals, members of the public incur two
sets of costs when performing due diligence—the cost of first
determining the kinds of information that should be reviewed, and
the additional cost of gathering that information about a
professional. If a member of the public cannot pay these costs when
250. For immigration attorneys, the lowest cost producer may be the
Department of Justice.
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selecting a professional, they accept additional risk and pay a cost
in outcomes and quality.
The cost may also be justified to the extent that it generates
incremental improvements in the markets for professional
services. As discussed above, these markets now fail to function
effectively and impose tremendous costs on society. Even though a
move to embrace effective disclosure structures will impose costs
on some professionals, it offers a substantial improvement over the
status quo. 251
2. Pandering
A disclosure system may change behavior. Some may fear that
a Professional Prospectus regime might cause professionals to
pander to avoid complaints instead of delivering hard news. If
professionals fear the economic impact of a complaint on their
reputational capital, they may alter their practices to avoid
complaints in ways that diminish client or patient outcomes.
A well-designed disclosure system may significantly mitigate
this risk by focusing disclosure on relevant information with
predictive value. In the medical context, patients would likely
prefer to work with a doctor with strong outcomes in a procedure
even if a few other patients had filed complaints. 252
Despite pandering’s pejorative connotation, changing
communication style and responsiveness may do significant good
for clients. Attorney ethics rules generally require attorneys to
communicate with clients and “promptly inform” them of “any
decision or circumstance relevant to the client’s informed consent”
and to “promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information.” 253 Poor communication does not only generate
attorney complaints—it also violates the profession’s ethical
rules. 254
251. Supra Part I.
252. These predictive disclosures may also be required to obtain meaningful
informed consent. See supra notes 206–207 and accompanying text (discussing
informed consent in the medical context).
253. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
254. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal
Ethics, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1109 (2013) (“By perusing bar disciplinary records
one would also learn about a myriad of less newsworthy but nonetheless
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3. Strategic Client Selection
Professionals may behave strategically in response to a
disclosure system and refuse to do business with certain types of
clients or patients. For example, physicians measured by patient
outcomes, may decline to perform medical procedures on certain
groups of patients if they may be more likely to experience
complications that would mar a physician’s disclosure record. If
many physicians behaved strategically, the best outcome rates
could reflect a wealthy and relatively healthy patient population
more than skill. Similarly, lawyers might opt against serving
disfavored communities or out of practice areas to avoid
complaints.
An effective benchmarking system would mitigate the dangers
posed by strategic client and patient selection. In the medical
context, effective benchmarking means that the relevant
benchmark would need to consider the physician’s patient
population. Outcome statistics for physicians treating different
populations should not be presented as fair comparisons. While
generating more appropriate benchmarks would increase costs,
the cost of information aggregation and analysis continues to
decline rapidly, making effective benchmarking more feasible.
Some behavioral changes might improve healthcare overall.
At present, some physicians may reap financial rewards if a
patient experiences complications because they will be required to
perform additional medical procedures. 255
In the legal context, more strategic case selection might check
frivolous litigation. 256 Attorneys that file low-probability lawsuits
important ethical violations—failure to communicate with clients, neglect of
client matters, failure to provide competent representation, and misuse of client
trust funds.”); see also Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox
and Promise of Restorative Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253, 259–60 (2012)
(reporting that the most common disciplinary complaints made against attorneys
involve neglect and lack of communication).
255. Cf. Jonathan Baert Wiener, Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk
Management, 9 RISK 39, 49 (1998)
To a provider paid on a fee-for-service basis, the iatrogenic side effects
of initial treatment might constitute an unintentional source of
additional revenues (up to the point that the iatrogenesis drives the
patient to choose a different provider, or to expire), and such a provider
would therefore have less financial incentive to prevent iatrogenesis.
256. See Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological
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may not always internalize the costs their suits place on the
public. 257 Their clients may also not realistically assess the merits
of their case and may assume that an attorney’s willingness to go
forward indicates a reasonable probability of success.
4. Statistical Barriers to Entry
Freshly-minted professionals might object to this type of
disclosure system because it may reduce the ability of newer
professionals to attract initial clients. New professionals lack a
record of outcomes that can be used. Here, it would be most
appropriate to simply disclose that the professional is newly
licensed.
This does not mean that young professionals would not
benefit. With a well-designed system, some populations of new
professionals would rely on a firm’s reputation. These firm-specific
disclosures would offer the most useful information to potential
clients because the more senior professionals at that firm will be
able to provide additional guidance and mentor the new
professional.
Of course, a new professional without any history and without
a firm’s reputation to rely on might face some disadvantage
because they are an unknown. This could create some market
pressure for new professionals to affiliate with high-quality firms
in their early years. On balance, that seems to be a good thing.
Importantly, a disclosure regime would not lock new
professionals out of the market. Even new solo practitioners
without any information to disclose would likely benefit from
improved disclosures in two ways. First, if a client knows that the
new professionals want good outcomes to build their reputation,
they may be willing to give new professionals a chance. The other
benefit emerges from improved market function. If the disclosure
system raises the level of practice and mitigates the lemon

Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 185–86 (2000) (“For most litigants and attorneys
in the trenches of the civil justice system, however, a frivolous case is simply a
case in which the plaintiff has a low probability of prevailing at trial.”).
257. See supra Part I (discussing the negative externalities created by
frivolous litigation).
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problem, overall demand for legal services and the rational price
to pay for an unknown goes up.
B. Additional Implications
Other considerations may also motivate the adoption of a
Professional Prospectus system.
1. Mitigating Implicit Bias
Implicit bias plays a substantial role in how persons evaluate
others. 258 A well-meaning person that unknowingly associates
professional competence with an image of an older white male may
make suboptimal choices when selecting professional service
providers by avoiding highly competent professionals that happen
to be members of minority groups. 259
A Professional Prospectus system may counteract implicit bias
by giving consumers more useful information about past outcomes.
For example, a person with highly negative views toward minority
racial groups might nonetheless elect to retain the services of a
minority surgeon with 20% better outcomes than the average
surgeon. When it comes to picking the person to perform a
sensitive, high-stakes procedure, clients will likely seek the
professional that offers a better probability.
2. Facilitating Information Intermediaries
A Professional Prospectus system would likely lower costs for
information intermediaries to gather and analyze data. At present,
a variety of private, for-profit firms provide lawyer rating
258. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:
Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006) (“[T]he science of implicit
cognition suggests that actors do not always have conscious, intentional control
over the processes of social perception, impression formation, and judgment that
motivate their action.”).
259. Cf. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and
Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 485 (2007) (“Whatever it
reflects, implicit bias can result in behaviors and evaluations that limit the
opportunities of minority group members.”).
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services. 260 By standardizing disclosures and making information
more public, these organizations will likely face lower costs for
compiling and creating recommendations.
These intermediaries may play a vital role in amplifying the
benefits of a Professional Prospectus regime by providing regularly
updated rankings and indicia of quality. Consumers entering a
market may use these services to select professionals—
significantly mitigating the lemon problem and allowing higher
quality professionals to earn returns.
3. Best Practices
A Professional Prospectus system may cause professionals to
more quickly adopt best practices. In a competitive market,
professionals winning the highest marks on disclosure forms will
become model practitioners. Once the most effective practices are
identified, many other practitioners will likely alter their practices
to obtain the same results. Broad release of the information may
also affect human capital flows because ambitious young
professionals will prefer to join professional firms with superior
scores.
This knowledge transfer might happen through different
mechanisms. Professionals with poorer outcomes might now lack
comparative information that could show that they could achieve
gains by changing their practices. A disclosure system could
provide useful information to them and nudge them toward
improving outcomes. In group practice settings, shared
accountability would likely increase mentoring and knowledge
transfer within firms.
V. Conclusion
Although
occupational
licensing
and
professional
self-regulation provide one solution for regulating professional
services markets, this Article calls for a blended approach that
amplifies reputational forces. While consumers may not be able to
260. See Renee Newman Knake, The Commercialization of Legal Ethics, 29
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 715, 719 (2016) (discussing lawyer rating services).
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evaluate professional services directly, relevant information does
emerge over time. In many instances, relevant information is
already public and either available on a webpage or with a routine
request for access to information.
The public often struggles to perform even basic due diligence
on professionals because they are often one-shot players in the
system. Almost by definition, one-shot players face staggering
search and analysis costs for information because they do not know
the range of information available or how to identify the most
valuable information.
Pushing appropriately tailored information out to consumers
at initial points of contact should improve overall market
functioning in multiple ways. It will make it easier for consumers
to avoid the least competent professionals and increase the
business flowing to more competent professionals. If the system
functions well, underserved market segments may see
significantly more activity. If the system makes only modest
improvements, it may still generate public benefits worth the cost.
Relatively minor efficiency gains in massive markets generate
sizeable benefits.
Ultimately, the concept has broad applicability. While this
Article suggests that immigration court practice could provide an
initial use case, other administrative courts might also be able to
implement similar schemes. As statistical information about
outcomes associated with individual professionals becomes more
readily available, a move to increased disclosure seems likely to
happen. The best professionals will push for disclosure because of
the economic rewards for their skills. The least competent may face
increasing litigation alleging a lack of informed consent.

